



The University of Texas at Austin
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Reflections on the World History of the Politics of Liberation

Special Issue Edited and Translated by
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Welcome to Volume 11, Issue 1 (Fall 2022) of the Texas Education Review

We are pleased to announce the publication of Volume 11, Issue 1 of the Texas Education Review. In this Special Issue, guest editor Adam Martinez has brought together and translated a collection of papers that emerged out of the seedbed (*semillero*) seminar of the *Asociación de Filosofía y Liberación* dedicated to the study of philosophy of liberation. The papers presented here represent the group's engagement with the first volume of Enrique Dussel's trilogy on Politics. The issue begins with some preliminary words by Dussel as well as an introduction to the special issue by Adam Martinez and ends with some concluding words by Noah De Lissovoy. We at the Texas Educational Review are proud to be a part of the important conversation taking place across Latin America that is placing in question the foundations of the prevailing order, that is proposing a distinct paradigm, and is laboring in the creation of a more just reality.

Information for Contributors

The Texas Education Review is an independent, peer reviewed, student-run scholarly publication based at the College of Education at The University of Texas at Austin. The Texas Education Review was founded and is operated by doctoral students at The University of Texas at Austin's College of Education, which consistently ranks as one of the best public university graduate education programs in the United States. The Texas Education Review aims to advance scholarship by publishing an academic journal of the highest quality including works by graduate students, professors, and practitioners, focusing on education policy and related issues. This journal features articles, essays, notes, and reviews relevant to a national and international audience of scholars and practitioners.

The Texas Education Review focuses on analysis of education policy and related issues, with nonexclusive preference given to issues affecting the State of Texas. Each issue shall display unparalleled excellence in content and style. Further, The Texas Education Review fosters the academic and professional development of its members through participation in the editorial process and each member displays the highest standards of integrity and professional excellence in every endeavor. From *Sweatt v. Painter* and *No Child Left Behind*, to charter schools, curriculum policy, and textbook adoption, the State of Texas has played and will continue to play a critical role in shaping education policy in the United States. The Texas Education Review is located directly on The University of Texas's campus in the heart of downtown Austin. Its close proximity to the Texas Capitol, Texas Education Agency, and State Board of Education offers unparalleled access to the thought leaders, policy makers, and academics who are driving education policy in Texas.



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Foreword to the Special Issue: AFyL and the Reading of the Politics of Liberation

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Foreword to the Special Issue: AFyL and Reading of the Politics of Liberation

ENRIQUE DUSSEL

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The Zapatista Revolution begins to show signs of activity in the 5th centennial of the memory of the invasion of America by the Spaniards, it emerges as a collective actor in 1994 with native peoples as protagonists, opening new questions in political philosophy with that of: “Among us—the Zapatistas proclaimed—those who lead, lead by obeying.” We will have to wait until 1999 with the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela, and especially with the Bolivian one of 2005, to hear from Evo Morales, an American Indian, that of: “I exercise an obediencial power!” This formulation by Evo “hit the nail on the head” and allowed us to restructure the entire Politics of Liberation that I had been developing since the publication of *Ethics of Liberation*. The theoretical task articulates itself with ongoing revolutions, analyzing the concrete practical field of politics led to a political philosophy. Politics of Liberation is part of the process of what could be called the Latin American revolutions of the second emancipation, which have been developing since the second half of the 20th century, as a philosophy it must express the theory that is being created in the praxis of multiple participatory experiences that are already taking place in various horizons of the continent, and that, for example, Boaventura de Sousa Santos has exemplified in numerous publications.

This special issue is a small contribution to Latin American social movement, it is didactic and pedagogical, product of the seminar organized by the Asociación de Filosofía y Liberación (AFyL), which emerges as a proposal in 2010 in Mazatlán, where in a general assembly it was agreed to create spaces for the dissemination and development of the Philosophy of Liberation. The call for its creation was given during the Simposio de Filosofía de la Liberación registered in the Congreso Internacional de Filosofía, which took place in 2014 in Morelia, an initiative that is put into practice in the second semester of 2014 with the reading, exposition and discussion of the book *Philosophy of Liberation*. The proposal initially served as a pilot plan and was reformulated in January 2015 under the name of “Filosofía de la Liberación. Perspectivas y prospectivas” whose first session was titled: “Genealogía de la Filosofía de la Liberación de Enrique Dussel.”

The second session we titled: “Los orígenes de la Filosofía de la Liberación” with the aim of approaching the first criticisms to Philosophy of Liberation. Once cycle II was concluded, we began with session III titled: “Política de la Liberación: Crítica”. The objective will be an approach to the fundamentals of the Critical part of the Politics of Liberation. In the second half of 2021 we will continue with *Política de la Liberación II* and in the first half of 2022, Volume III.

In the seven years that we have been working without interruption, the AFyL seedbed is currently in a process of growth and internationalization, the uncertainty of the pandemic has led us to continue by electronic means that we are still exploring in an emergent way.

Enrique Dussel is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the *Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Iztapalapa*, and in the College of Philosophy at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). He received a doctorate in philosophy at the National University of Cuyo, Mendoza and a second doctorate in history from La Sorbonne in Paris. He is president and founder of the *Asociación de Filosofía y Liberación* (AFyL).

Gabriel Herrera Salazar received his PhD from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). He has specialized in the fields of Ethics, Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Liberation. He is the author of the books: *Vida humana, muerte y sobrevivencia* (2015), *Ensayos heréticos* (2016) *Metodología de la liberación para las Ciencias Sociales* (2018) y *Buscando fondo en el vacío y otros cuentos* (2019). He has been a member of the *Asociación de Filosofía y Liberación* (AFyL) since 2010.



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Confronting the Limits of this World: History, Politics of Liberation, and Education

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Confronting the Limits of *this* World: History, Politics of Liberation, and Education

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This special issue is the result of an ongoing *semillero* (seedbed) organized by the *Asociación de Filosofía y Liberación* (AFyL)—founded in 1982 by Enrique Dussel in Bogotá, Columbia. For more than a year now the participants of the seminars have been reading and discussing Dussel’s soon to be completed three volume series on politics. For each meeting, a member was invited to write a paper as a way of setting off the discussion; it is these papers, in our study of Dussel’s first volume, *Política de la liberación: Historia mundial y crítica* (2007), that are translated and collected in this issue. Ironically, the pandemic that we have all been living through these past years, while locally isolating and alienating, by forcing the move to a virtual modality made the incorporation of members from across the Americas possible. This is to say that the authors of these papers are a diverse group, and in that diversity, we witness the degree to which Dussel’s work reflects and speaks to the experiences of those on the margins of *this* world, generating critical hope.

I first came across *filosofía de la liberación* as a fourth-grade teacher living in Caldwell, Idaho. I would drive 30 minutes to Nyssa Elementary School, just across the Snake River into Oregon, and 30 minutes back, often listening to Dussel’s presentations and courses—readily accessible online. That area of Oregon and Idaho is known as the Treasure Valley, it is for both states, but especially for Idaho, an important source of wealth and profit. Here, Japanese, then—after World War II—Mexican workers, have labored in the agricultural fields—*la papa, cebolla, espiga, etc.*—fulfilling the demand for cheap labor for decades now. Dussel’s work on political economy (Dussel, 2014) helped me to understand the hunched figure among the *curcos* that I drove past in the spring and summer, wearing a wide brimmed hat, a bandana shielding the back of their neck, and long sleeve shirt—*raza, el pueblo, mi gente*, the exploitation of their life/energy the source of a burgeoning metropolis with pretensions to goodness and sophistication. His work upended how I viewed what was recently considered in a popular, economy-related news outlet, “the best city to live in.” Boise, the capital of Idaho, became gaudy, ugly even in a *deep*, aesthetic sense—how could I, or anyone for that matter, believe in that glossy veneer after seeing it from the outside, from the position of the marginalized and excluded whose *living labor* is the denied source of its living(-deadness), its Other (Martínez, 2022)?

That is what Dussel’s work does. His ethics, political economy, aesthetics, and here his history of politics, begin and end with that *life* that is excluded/violated/negated: *exteriority*. The affirmation of the outside espoused by *Filosofía de la liberación*—perhaps because it was cultivated in and emerges from the periphery—does not seek inclusion and/or assimilation, does not seek the “success” or “achievement” of the center. Instead, the *material content* for us is *la corporalidad viviente del ser humano en comunidad*. The desired outcome is a new world born out of the *will-to-live* of those who suffer the reigning system. It is, in the decolonial vein, a project of turning away, de-linking from the center (Mignolo, 2007). For us, it is the Other who is the source of the new, the Other who *interpellates* the centered and privileged subject, rupturing its *Sameness* in their drive towards *life* (Dussel, 1998). This *analectic*—a rupturing and transcendence from exteriority—is a necessary category because we confront a system that is autoreferential, believes in itself as *uni*-versal, natural, divine, and in its necrophilic drive to satisfy its metabolism, places the very conditions for life to endure on this planet in jeopardy. For Dussel, the dialectics of the center—mere reform that parades as change and

progress—are incapable of transcending the Totality, of escaping the “net of ontology,” and only produce what philosophy of liberation refers to as *lo Mismo*—the Same (Dussel, 1973).

Filosofía de la liberación generates a sort of hope and energy that we are not meant to be in possession of. Postmodern reasoning, perforce in critical spaces, tells us that *grand narratives*, now debunked relics of the past, are no longer accessible—concealing the fact that capitalism has generated and polices the “grandest” of all narratives. As Alicia Hopkins explains in her reflection in this volume: “Market fundamentalism has taken the place of the macro-narratives that postmodern thinkers had written off, strategically utilizing amnesia—which uproots—and the fetishization of history—which naturalizes domination—as ideological tools that are not easy to dismantle.” The confidence of naming and knowing the world—of generating a *grand narratif*—is meant to be the purview of whiteness. However, the work that is emerging from the global South, this collection of essays included, aims not only of de-structing the prevailing order of things, it is, in the positive, creative sense, laboring in the construction of a more just world from and for the outside—one where many worlds will fit as the neo-Zapatistas say. We are affirming our own categories and a new world is being born, with a new *reason* for which the affirmation of *life*—human and nonhuman—is its fundamental principal.

Limits to be broken

It is with this project in mind—a decolonial, transmodern project—that Dussel sets about a reinterpretation of world history. In the introduction to the first volume of *Política*, Dussel states that his aim is to “break, destroy, de-construct, to formulate a story from a new basis (not just re-construct), that is, 'de-structure' to compose the story from another historical paradigm.” For our author, official history is contained within certain limiting frameworks that determine what can be said and what is *not said*. While I will not go into detail regarding each of these limits—anyone interested can read Dussel’s introduction to *Política I*—I want to discuss a few of these to provide an indication of just how important Dussel’s history is. After all, it is these boundaries and their policing that perpetually reinscribe us within the Totality. The limits that I will emphasize here are eurocentrism, “the periodification according to the European criteria of political philosophy”, and secularism.

Dussel’s careful historical investigation uncovers and explores the fact that what the West attributes to itself, from the technology that makes the industrial revolution possible, to the philosophical foundations that ground its Being is a violent plagiarism. Hopkins writes in the first paper of this collection, Dussel’s critical world history:

...unmasks cultural appropriation, imitation: philosophy and its classic political concepts are not born in Greece, the first important city is not Athens; civilizing contributions such as writing, the alphabet, geometry, astronomy, develop thousands of years before the formation of the western world.

Hopkins’s statement should not surprise us, after all, what life engenders, births, and nurtures itself? Such a view reveals a *fetishized* system, one that denies the inherent relationality of any reality and believes in itself as *sui generis*. Dussel reveals many important concealments, omissions, and equivocations in the construction of “the West,” Modernity, or Western Civilization. After this de-structuring, it will no longer be possible for Europe to be the center and end of politics and history. Moreover, the historical destruction accomplished here is necessary and creates space to begin from our particular historical and cultural worlds, to take into account and affirm, in Dussel’s words,

“...the politics of the high Egyptian and Mesopotamian cultures...the political and strategic culture of the Chinese Empire, Hindustan, Islam, and equally, as Latin Americans, the politics of the Aztec, Mayan and Incan kingdoms.”

The eurocentrism described above created the conditions by which we all, the world over, study history according to the following periodization: ancient, middle, and modern ages. Dussel carefully uncovers the ideological foundation of this organizing of human history as if it were relevant universally, applicable to all. Moreover, our author provides us with a distinct framework for understanding world history that, as I have suggested already, seeks to contribute to the construction of *a world where many worlds fit*, and the negation of one that sees its own particularity as uni-versal, applicable to all. An important example of the above is the contemporaneity of the medieval dark ages—an era marked by societal and cultural decline—and the Islamic golden era—an era of scientific and cultural flourishing that would generate important discoveries crucial to the development of Modernity. Not only does it make little sense to speak of a universal time of decline and barbarity—or of an era characterized by a lack of records if one prefers that definition of “dark.” This example also demonstrates the fetishization of the Modern subject: a solipsistic/egomaniacal subject that attributes everything good and beautiful to itself, and everything bad and ugly to its Other.

The final limit to mention here is that of “the *secularism* traditional to political philosophies.” Of the many important topics Dussel and the papers collected here cover, the “de-struction” of Modern secularity stands out. Our author makes explicit the mythic and religious foundations of the secular subject that are at the heart of Modernity. Here we might point to the inattention to the religious content of Hobbes’s political analysis—the categories and concepts of which are essential to Modern politics. Dussel points out that half of *Leviathan* is dedicated to founding the King’s authority in God and establishing an “explicitly theological biblical hermeneutic.” From the personal singular freedom central to Modern political discourse, to the experience of solidarity with the Other—“...the oppressed, the victims, the poor, the widow, the orphan, the foreigner, the excluded from the demos or the forum, the hungry, thirsty, naked and disabled carnality...”—Dussel provides us with an account that, once again, by clearing away Modern pretensions to objective superiority, demonstrates the necessity for those marginalized and excluded from/by Modernity to think again—politically and philosophically—from their distinct systems of meaning and living. For those interested, Erick Padilla’s reflection in this issue provides additional insights on the topic.

The rupturing of these limits, and the others that I haven’t given attention to, fit into a project and framework of liberation that aims at the transcendence—a going beyond—of Modernity from outside, from *exteriority*. It is not a project of simply turning inward to our own particularities, but one of revealing the irrationality of (post)modernity, negating the negation of the human, of subsuming what is useful and creating a new, more just reality.

Relevance for Education

The limits that Dussel aims at transcending with his world history, are also foundational limits that we confront in educational research. The most readily perceivable issue here is that of the content of the curriculum. What might a new history, fundamentally informed by the politics of liberation, look like, one that no longer perpetuates a “derogatory orientalism,” nor sees the West as the culmination and end of human evolution and experience? Dussel’s history, and the papers collected here provide

only indications of the accounts we must create for future generations and ourselves. There remains much work to be done.

At another level, the “de-struction” of western secularism, raises important question about, not just the content, but also the form of schooling and education. *Política I* shows how the very concepts and categories that are at the core of how schools are constituted and structured, how students are understood and subjectified, are not purely objective, natural, and secular, but always already ideological and deeply religious. Thus, for a post-secular moment, what might it mean to create new institutions from distinct religiosities, from those horizons of meaning that were/are excluded, silenced and/or erased in coloniality/Modernity?

Organization of papers

A forward for this issue was prepared by Dussel and Gabriel Salazar, and an afterword by Noah De Lissovoy. The organization of the papers themselves follows from the organization of Dussel’s texts. These short reflections are not exhaustive of the topics that Dussel covers but provide a tight synthesis of the key points and highlight what was most salient to the individual authors.

In the first two, Alicia Hopkins discusses the foundations of political discourse and Dussel’s shift in the genesis of the political from ancient Greece to the Neolithic. Erick Padilla then explores the development and emergence of the secular state. The third fourth and fifth contributions center on early modernity (1492 – the late 18th century). Jesús Ayala-Coloqui examines the context of modern politics with special attention to the importance and influence of China, the Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Italian Renaissance. Rodrigo Marcos de Jesus presents to us what Dussel refers to us as “the first early modernity,” and the shift from England, France and Holland to Spain and Portugal as the ground zero of Modernity. Christian Soazo Ahumada discusses the organization of the dominant economic liberalism that take place and a potential of exteriority that is present in the “republican common” and the idea of “popular sovereignty.” In the final three contributions, Diana Alejandra Díaz Guzman addresses the important question of the liberating elements in the political philosophy of mature modernity, Nadia Heredia reflects on the first Latin American emancipation, the idea of *el pueblo*—*the people*—and populism in Latin America, and Katya Colmenares Lizárraga articulates the emergence of Philosophy of Liberation with the decolonial turn in Latin America that departs from *el pueblo*.

The papers in this issue, and Dussel’s text itself, suggest that, given the global scope of coloniality, liberatory and decolonial projects in the U.S. should resist myopic postmodernisms that dismiss rationality as rationality and fetishize difference. For example, within a postmodern, North American decolonial framework, what can we say of the fact that Hinduism is responsible for the first formal, philosophical logic around 100 CE? Or that the word *demos*—as in democracy—is of Egyptian origin? Or that Cartesian dualism isn’t all that European? One thing at least, that we give too much credit to Whiteness, to Europe and the West, place too much stock in its self-aggrandizing narratives. In the refusal of what we have deemed to be of the colonizer there is the possibility of doubling down on “derogatory orientalisms,” reifying Whiteness by ceding to it the great discoveries of the Other. If it is true, as Fanon described, that decolonization is a violent project of disorder, then we will need to take back what was stolen, dismembering it from the White corpus, not leave it for lost, or worse, forget that it was ours in the first place. While such a project is necessarily total disorder from the vantage of the privileged/centered subject—an order that required the

fragmenting and disordering of the worlds of the Other—that chaos will be the aperture to the creation of a new, more just Totality.

Adam Martínez is a doctoral candidate in the Cultural Studies in Education program at the University of Texas at Austin. His academic interests are in *filosofía de la liberación*, interaction ritual theory, Marxism, decolonial possibilities, and critical ethnography. His dissertation is an ethnographic study that seeks to understand the Spirit of whiteness as it is manifest in teacher education as experienced by Brown preservice teachers.

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Archaeosystem, Urban Revolution and Rationalized Unification of the Political

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Archaeosystem, Urban Revolution and Rationalized Unification of the Political

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At any given time, the living see themselves in the midday of history. They are obliged to prepare a banquet for the past. The historian is the herald who invites the dead to the table.

-Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*

Introduction

Política de la liberación: Historia mundial y crítica (2007) is the first volume of a soon to be completed trilogy in the complex theoretical production of Enrique Dussel. The second volume corresponds to *architectonics* (2009), and the last—put together in a collaborative manner and not yet published—to critique and the creation of the new. History, architectonics, and critique are the three constitutive moments of the political philosophy of liberation. The philosophy of liberation seeks to comprehend the historical drama of humanity from an *antimodern grand narrative*, to construct the theoretical base that founds political power upon *life*, and to comprehend the entropic and transformative dimension of political power from an ineluctable ethical commitment.

This first historical volume is the culmination of decades long work in the construction of a method and the elaboration of new philosophical categories that enable Dusselian liberation philosophy to establish new bases for another paradigm¹ of universal history. This is a history of humanity narrated from the not-said. A counter-narrative that, on the one hand, unties the knots² of modern political history, and on the other, is able to compose, to formulate, to again knot together a historical meaning.

This effort to knot together historical meaning is like a shout in the desert. In an age in which grand historical narratives were declared to have ended (Fukuyama, 2006), to write a world history is to produce theoretically what cannot be subsumed by neoliberal ideology. Market fundamentalism has taken the place of the macro-narratives that postmodern thinkers had written off, strategically utilizing amnesia—which uproots—and the fetishization of history—which naturalizes domination—as ideological tools that are not easy to dismantle. Unlike the attempt to recover the great story of Modernity as an unfinished task in an attempt to respond critically to our time, Dusselian philosophy of liberation, situated in a critique of colonialism, is given the arduous task of laying the foundations for a critical world history that, while dismantling the great story of Modernity, does not stop at the void of historical meaning proper to postmodern or market driven ideologies.

¹ Some of his historical works in which it is possible to encounter the initial methodological underpinnings and the character of the ethical-political commitment that constitute them are: *Hipótesis para el estudio de Latinoamérica en la historia universal* (1966—although it will not be published until 2003), *Historia de la Iglesia en América Latina* (1967), *Para una destrucción de la historia de la ética* (1972), *Historia de la filosofía y filosofía de la liberación* (1994).

² In *Para una de-strucción de la ética* Dussel maintains: “If one wants to make a lasso with a chord to tie something, it is necessary to have previously undone the knots that the chord might have. In the same way, when reflective thought confronts something, the proper attitude of *logos* (which comes from *legein* and essentially means: to collect, to reunite), must first know to un-walk the path in order to return to the origin” (1972, p. 5-6, my translation)

Writing a counter-story, building an anti-traditional tradition, seeking and showing the not-said, will come up against the following limits of the modern history of politics: a) Hellenocentrism, b) Occidentalism, c) Eurocentrism, d) hegemonic classical periodification, e) secularism, f) theoretical-mental colonialism and, lastly, g) the non-inclusion of Latin America in Modernity. And in order to circumvent these limits, the critical world history of politics of liberation carries out four simultaneous tasks:

- 1) It traces, narrates what has been hidden by the modern myth of progress and the civilization of the world that begins from the Occident and to which we are supposed to feel grateful.
- 2) It unmasks cultural appropriation, imitation: philosophy and its classic political concepts are not born in Greece, the first important city is not Athens; civilizing contributions such as writing, the alphabet, geometry, astronomy, develop thousands of years before the formation of the western world.
- 3) It dismantles the chronology of 18th century German romanticism that linked ancient Greece and Rome with contemporary Europe in a successive line of historical stages through which the civilizational unfolding of Europe is understood as universal history. At the same time, it reconstructs a chronology that goes back to the Paleolithic as the origin of the political, causing Greece and Rome to no longer seem, to our time, so ancient or so foundational, to say the least.
- 4) It rearranges, relocates, the origins of politics and attempts to weave a historical narrative that departs from the experience of oppressed peoples as political actors and from the political philosophies that have inspired them.

Now, these tasks, as the Dussel himself warns, are put forth as as an outline and suggests an (unfinished) path forward—remaining as a legacy for the generations that will follow. Dussel's *Para una de-structura de la historia de la ética* (1972) begins with an epigraph of Heidegger's that seems significant to me when approaching this monumental effort to write an Other universal history: "The greater the work of a thinker...the richer is what is unthought in this work..." (Heidegger, 1996, p. 71). This does not imply a sort of carelessness, but rather, a recognition that breaking the limits used by thought—in this case historical—opens unsuspected fields for research and formulates new questions.

The critical hypothesis for politics of liberation that I would like to raise before providing a cramped synthesis of the significant elements of this history, is that what must be further developed in order to continue this work initiated by Dussel consists in deepening the recognition, the listening, the tracking, of those voices that are not yet fully understood. While it is true that there are technical difficulties in terms of tracing these stories, it is also true that the unfinished character of this work may imply other problems that Dussel does not address.

I find at least two problems: On the one hand, it seems to me that in the important effort to show cultural, scientific, political greatness outside and before Europe, the West, or Greece, the historian's gaze opens and puts other experiences under observation, dismantles and decenters, but we still need to give an account of how these other experiences themselves sustain relations of domination. The Benjaminian warning "there is no document of civilization that is not at the same time a document of barbarism" (2008, p. 68) is the thorn in the side of one who would write critical history and who would not allow themselves to be enchanted by "great events," even by those that are just being discovered. A task, without a doubt, difficult to sustain along the way when the finding of the unspoken surprises us.

On the other hand, in our time it has become urgent to question the very limits of the anthropocentric paradigm in politics. When in *The Storyteller* Benjamin asks himself if the course of the world "is determined by the history of salvation or by the history of nature?" (2009, p. 55), he shows how the historical paradigm, even messianic ones such as Marxism, has not managed to develop its premises beyond the limits of the anthropocentric border and has not understood what Maturana and Varela have called the autopoiesis³ of life and which must be considered as other important theoretical moments of the political philosophy of liberation.

The reconstruction of history from below retraces the path in search of what has been forgotten, it is a "history against the grain" that offers guidelines, which looks at the past from messianic categories and situates itself in a present that demands the concrete action of justice. Instead of holding up new events that might allow the hegemonic history to be dislocated, the task would be, rather, to find the ruins of any possible history to be narrated. From the archaeosystem to the Roman empire, which is the historical fragment the paper deals with, what are the faces of oppression, what structures were consolidating themselves in the relationship of domination with the rest of life on the planet? It is not a question to be fully answered in this brief introductory text, but rather to point out ways in which we might approach this text on the history of politics of liberation to find some clues.

From archaeosystem to the Roman Empire

The will to live at the origin of the political

Unlike the so-called modern "contractualist theories" that found the state and power upon the idealistic opposition between a state of nature and a properly political one, Dussel takes an anthropological path to date the originating time of politics in the first institutions that the human gave itself during the Paleolithic that permitted grouping, alliance and the exchange between families. And unlike negative conceptions of power understood as domination in the Weberian tradition, Dussel will emphasize the power of the will-to-live that, although at this moment is established through a historical narrative, will be fundamental in the ethical scaffolding of the political philosophy developed in the second and third volumes of the *Politics of Liberation*.

What draws our attention at this first moment is the coinciding with a Freudian description of an economy of desire that allows Dussel to explain the emergence of institutionality: the ceding of instinct to social principles, the postponement of desire and the admission of suffering to postpone greater pains.⁴ It draws our attention because, in some way, it appears to be in tension with the unitary and non-negative visions of corporeality that the author himself tries to recover from the horizon of Semitic understanding, and because it seems, additionally, to maintain the classic western

³ See for example: *Materiales para una política de la liberación* (2007, p. 121).

⁴ Already in the 20 political theses published a year before the work that concerns us here, Dussel pointed out: "S. Freud thought that 'culture was the postponement of desire', in the sense that the desire to sleep, for example, of a peasant, must be disciplined to interrupt it, postpone it early in the morning to work the fields. The pain of the early rise, however, compensates for the hunger of the root collector or hunter. The discipline of the farmer is a certain pain; but the pain of hunger of those who must without security look for food all day is greater. The institution of agriculture postpones the desire to eat all the seeds (leaving some for next year's sowing), the desire to sleep longer, the desire to wander on the plains of the nomad, etc. But that discipline (...) is useful for life and necessary to improve it qualitatively. It is the moment a) of the institution. " (2006, p. 58)

paradigm of the nature-culture opposition⁵, animality-rationality, that is constitutive of a vision of the human necessarily integrated when thinking about its history and that from other historical paradigms would be called into question. It would be good to extend our analysis on these points to critique the Freudian conception of desire and what is not questioned in this historical paradigm, but the limits of this review prevent us from doing so, so we only leave these annotations as possible routes to continue working on the criticism of this critical history.

Now, the first institution, Dussel maintains, agreeing once again with Freud, is the incest taboo. This “proto-power” structure allows the constitution of an order—an order that required the development of implicit principles that made the political field more complex. Born with this first institution is the obligation to comply with consensual rule, the imposition of punishments, the celebration of rites of reparation and the demand for the respect of authority. All this in the Paleolithic which, as we previously stated, is the temporal setting for the constitution of political development.

Dussel points out: the “instinctive inhospitable nature” was transformed into “the nice cultural home of the human being” (Dussel, 2011, p. 4). But this characterization as the “nice cultural home of the human being” constituted upon incest taboo seems to forget that incest is not so much a rule that prohibits marriage with the mother, sister or daughter, as a rule that obliges the giving of the mother, sister or daughter to another in the establishment of alliances between clans, thus shaping, little by little, the gregarious life in increasingly broad social groups where the political field will gain in complexity (Rubin, 1975). In this sense, the oppression of women is a substantial element in the development of this archaeosystem in which “humanity demonstrated that it could remain, that it could exist as living, rational and pulsating” (Dussel, 2011, p. 5), but at the cost of women’s will-to-live, which consequently leads us to argue that we cannot properly speak of “humanity” universally, and that this archaeosystem, erected since the Paleolithic era, seems to show in the origin of institutionality not only a will-to-live, but also a will-to-power that denies, in this case, the will-to-live of women. How else could we, nevertheless, narrate the origin of the will-to-live as an institution without it being sustained by a relationship of gender domination? The question remains open.

The Neolithic, the urban revolution and the conformation of regional systems

With the end of nomadism and the establishment of the first cities, the field of politics was born, which, also for Dusselian philosophy, is a practical field that supposes the *polis*. But a *polis* constituted thousands of years before ancient Greece and Rome that will be rather its culmination. Six thousand years ago, sedentarism began a long process in the establishment of primitive cities that in Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt, the Indus Valley, China and the Eastern Mediterranean will become cities where the development of trade will bring with it the need for writing, the alphabet, and structures and institutions for the exercise of power resulting in “the highest institutional degree of rationalization of a community’s political relations” (Dussel, 2011, p. 9).

This history gives an account of how, for example, in the Mediterranean world, these cities were republics governed by oligarchies made up of farmers, industrialists and merchants—prototype of urban-port political systems, and of shipping and commercial empires that are the origin of the constitutional forms of Greek and Roman cities. Hence the possibility of overcoming the so-called

⁵ Dussel also refers to this opposition when he recovers the learning that the sophists had acquired throughout the experience of their travels that showed the cultural diversity of the peoples. (2007, p. 60)

"Greek miracle," and re-positions Greece in a more appropriate place in the history of politics as the culmination of a millennial process in Asia Minor and Egypt and not as the origin or birth of politics (as the narratives of modern history have ideologically taught us).

Furthermore, in this history it is important to show that writing allows the explicitness of political normativity in legal systems, for example, in Mesopotamia, almost 4500 years ago. Although these legal systems standardize a system of slavery and patriarchal domination, they also account for a critical opening. The Shulgi or Ur-Nammu Code (2094-2047 BC) shows a critical formulation of the law:

I did not give the orphan to the rich man, I did not give the widow to the powerful man, I did not give the man of one peso to the man of a thousand pesos, I did not give the man of a lamb to the man of an ox[...] I did not impose jobs, I made hatred, violence and the cry for justice disappear. I established justice in the country. (2007, p. 23)

This formulation, taken up by the Code of Hammurabi (1792-2750 BC) which, additionally, will make the public reading of the text possible, shows the construction of that space in which the rules are subject to common judgment, paves the way for intersubjective validity and creates a certain symmetry in the participation of those affected to socially apply pressure with legitimacy (2007, p. 24).

Another aspect that is important in this history is the construction of the symbolic narratives—like that of the resurrection of the dead and "the eye that sees everything" of Osiris—that gave rise to an ethical-political tradition that will be the source of what will later be Greece, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These symbolic narratives constitute the ethical-mythical nucleus that will be at the base—but denied, forgotten—of Western civilization and of the horizon of meaning from which we interpret and live out our quotidian reality. They are, for Dussel, those traditions that open the singular conscience to an ethical-political intersubjectivity that, on the one hand, places the actor on the public horizon and exposes that actor to both social and divine judgment. On the other hand, establishes a unitary, carnal anthropology that affirms the existence of the body, which will be a critical source in the opposition to the dualistic vision that later Manichaeism, Hellenism and Christianity will establish in their denial of corporality with the ethical-political consequences that follow from it.

Now, the narration of political development in the Neolithic on this side of the Atlantic is going to recover the *Maya*, *Mexica* and *Inca* civilizations as sources to think about political power from another, non-modern, horizon of meaning. In this story that begins more than 7000 years ago along with the first traces of agriculture, what Dussel recovers, beyond description, is the cosmogonic conception of politics and its cosmopolitanism. That is to say, it is a political power anchored to a history of the celestial universe that works in a context of ethnic, linguistic, political and cultural diversity. In the same way as in Egypt, the legitimizing myths will establish an order that allows the development of military and merchant power. The forms of organization in which life is reproduced in a community are rescued, such as the *altépetl* and the *ayllu*, and the ontologically distinct relation that exists between these civilizations and the cosmos. For example, in the case of the Incas, the constitution of the political order whose ultimate purpose is to maintain the order of the universe and thus avoid the occurrence of *pachakutik*, or disorder, disharmony.

The great empires and the rationalized unification of the political

In this stage, the history of politics will show how the empires forged on the Eurasian continent are macro-institutions of a political field that has gained in complexity and is now founded on war, thanks to the expansion of territories and wealth obtained by iron and horse as civilizing instruments.

From classical Chinese political philosophy, practical wisdom will be recovered, the conception of the time of politics as a time of opportunity very different from the Greek *kairos*, the strategic function of the doctrines that teach and stably organize the relations of power based on the virtue of obedience and respect for hierarchies. Almost two thousand years before the Christian era, the dynasties in China already had a bureaucratic, tributary system, supported by professional armies, with a collection of codes, with a construction of channels for navigation and walls to stop foreign invasions.

From the political thought of the Indian continent and the Iranian empires, an ethical-mythical nucleus will be born that will be put in conflict by philosophy of liberation with the one born on the horizon of Semitic understanding. On the one hand, the Brahminic tradition develops an ontology of subjectivity that brings with it an ethic of salvation, an interior vision and ascetic demands that renounce the pleasure of the body. The consequence is that the social order is not transcendent, a critique that will take effect when we look at politics and the common good in Aristotle. On the other hand, the Zoroastrianism that was born during the first Persian empire (559 BC), will produce a Manichaeism that will permeate political life with a certain dualism in which matter and body are related to evil.⁶

It is thus that Dussel reaches ancient Greece and Rome, but after a long journey of thousands of years in the process of complexification of intersubjective relations and political organization from the nomad of the Paleolithic to the great cities and empires of this Neolithic era in which we still find ourselves, but already situated in its final stage, of crisis and decadence. This work manages then, to dismantle the Greek miracle and reveal what has been hidden in the construction of its myth.

Final thoughts

We would like to point out some final reflections with the aim, not only of triggering the conversation in this space, but also to shore up the reasons for a broader reflection once it is time and to think more carefully about the exercise of philosophy of liberation in this effort to narrate another history of politics.

One of the clear bets of this effort, and which I think we cannot forget, is to narrate a sense of history that, unlike the empty and homogeneous time of modernity and the myth of progress, allows us to understand the open wound in the present that has yet to heal—"the enemy has not stopped winning" as Benjamin warns. This story seeks to be a political instrument. It is not the enjoyment of the cultured type that walks through the garden, following the image that Nietzsche himself (2000, p.

⁶ For more details on the development of this dualism in anthropology that has survived to this day, see: *El humanismo helénico* (1975) and *El dualismo en la antropología de la cristiandad* (1974) and contrast with *El humanismo semita* (1969).

32) sketches of the historian. It is not the amassing of new knowledge for the showcases of the academy. The vision of the past that is being built here does not seek the eternalization of a new image to replace the one that has been built by Modernity, but rather to establish a way of looking; a political way of looking at the past from the categories of a political philosophy situated in colonial critique that seeks the construction of a transmodern horizon of meaning that would enable another world of life more just than the one we live today.

And two more things: It seems to me that it is necessary to keep open the question regarding how to think about the relationship between life and history, life as a material principle that also transcends the living corporeality of the human and allows us to expand the sense of political action in the living organism we inhabit and call Earth. Additionally, I find it suggestive, in addition, to recover the myth of Cain and Abel that Dussel deals with in this text and that makes reference to the opposition between the utopia of desert nomadism represented by the innocence of Abel and the city as the space of the development of agriculture, domination and the evil that Cain represents.

In a historical moment of the culmination of the Neolithic in which most of humanity lives,, agglomerating in huge peripheries of hunger, impoverishment and violence and in which all forms of life are being threatened on the planet, maintaining the paradigm of politics in the space of the city seems to require us either to dismantle it in order to place the will-to-live and its institutional configuration beyond the cities, or to rethink the limits of the city itself and therefore, of politics, that allows the conservation and dignity of life. This is a task that philosophy of liberation has always taken as its own.

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The Rebellion of the Victims and the Slow Invention of the Secular State

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The Rebellion of the Victims and the Slow Invention of the Secular State

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Indeed, it is an arduous question, so that we can define ourselves as Latin Americans, that of knowing the starting point of our own culture. There are many who say that we were "born" in 1809-1825, as if our homeland appeared there and came out of nowhere (ex nihilo). And there are, specifically, many political parties or thinkers that originate our culture there. From there all our culture would start. It is impossible. There are others that go back to the 16th century. They are Hispanists who argue that everything starts from there, but it can't be either. Even the conqueror who came to America had a vision of the world, attitudes, etc. So we have to go back further. As long as we do not know how to place Latin America well in universal history, we will be like water that falls from the sky without knowing its origin. And what I say about culture, obviously we are going to say about the church; they are parts of the same bipolar phenomenon.

-Enrique Dussel, *Desintegración de la Cristiandad colonial y liberación*

Introduction

To better understand section four in the first chapter of *Política de la liberación: Historia mundial y crítica*, entitled “The rebellion of the victims and the slow invention of the secular State”, we must note that, for Enrique Dussel (2007), history is a constructive, progressive movement, which can be categorized into four stages: 1) The Egyptian-Mesopotamian (from the IV millennium BC), 2) the Indo-European (from the II millennium BC), 3) the Asian-Afro-Mediterranean (from the IV century AD) and 4) the world-system (from 1492 AD). In this section of the first chapter, Dussel (2007) introduces us to the third stage, which is made up of a) the regions of Persia and of the Turán-Tarim, and later the Muslim world (from the 7th century AD), as the center of commercial connections; b) India, as a productive center; c) China, as the extreme east; d) Bantu Africa, as the extreme southwest; e) the Byzantine-Russian world, as the Occidental extreme and f) Western Europe, as the western extreme (Dussel, 1998, p. 21). For the purposes of this presentation, I want to pay particular attention to how the third stage differs from the second; thus, the transformations that occur in stage III will denote, not only the limits of stage II, but will also demonstrate the constructive-progressive movement of history.

Among the transformations that distinguish the third stage from the second are the emergence of a) a political subjectivity capable of creating a notion of freedom and personal singularity that implies the ontological, ethical and historical horizon that will make modern politics possible (Dussel, 2007, p. 82-83); b) a world view that redefines corporeality and assumes historicity and c) an intersubjectivity that assumes responsibility for the life of slaves, or those marginalized or exploited in social strata (Dussel, 1998, p. 32). In this way, stage III constitutes a new evolutionary moment of great complexity that made possible: 1) the manifestation of the political subject with subjective freedom and self-referential responsibility, 2) the discovery of a new and unknown experience of communal life in solidarity on the part of public and private intersubjectivity, 3) the secularization of political structures, and 4) an aperture to exteriority, the future, the messianic kingdom (Dussel, 2007, p. 71). The latter constitutes solidarity with the Other—the oppressed, the victims, the poor, the widow, the orphan, the foreigner, the excluded from the demos or the forum, the hungry, thirsty, naked and disabled carnality (Dussel, 2007, p. 72). The victims of the state that did not appear as interpellants in the horizon of political subjectivity of stage II (Dussel, 1998, p. 32), now present the ontological and ethical-political conditions for modern politics to become possible.

For the purposes of this presentation, I wish to dwell especially on two views of the world characteristic of stage III: 1) the political subjectivity of the Semitic world and personal singular freedom, and 2) the secularization of political structures and the difference between Christianity and Christendom.

The political subjectivity of the Semitic world and personal singular freedom

According to Dussel (2007), political philosophy has ignored the deep ethical-political component of the messianic kingdom of Christianity and its founder, Jeshúa of Nazareth. This is largely due to two fundamental causes: 1) the failure to distinguish between “interpreting” the mythical-religious narratives or stories and carrying out a hermeneutic of said narratives and 2) the confusion between Christianity and Christendom. Although political philosophy has attempted to detach itself from a confessional claim of religious narratives, it has nevertheless lost the richness of a philosophical hermeneutic of mythical-religious narratives, which can be explained with a rational claim to truth (Dussel, 2007, p. 72). For this reason, Dussel (2007) pauses to see how the religious texts that present the figure of Jeshúa can shed light on the vision of the Christian world, and how this, in its essence, is laden with the Semitic tradition—central to the creation of a notion of freedom and personal political uniqueness.

The philosophical hermeneutics of Dussel (2007) pauses at the ethical-political effects of the teachings of Jeshúa since Dussel knows that these produced a critical intersubjectivity impossible to understand for the Indo-European peoples of stage II. Jeshúa of Nazareth began his historical legacy within the eastern region of the Roman Empire. However, the entirety of the Roman Empire did not prevent the founder of Christianity from emerging as an Other, stemming from a Semitic tradition. In *Desintegración de la Cristiandad colonial y liberación*, Dussel (1978) expounds how the values of the Semitic people are radically different from those of the deeply Hellenic, Indo-European people:

- 1) While for the Indo-European people the human being is a participation of the corruptible (the body) and the eternal (the soul); for the Semitic people, the human being is a unitary entity of *basar* (the flesh) and *nefesh* (life). In this way, there is no corporal/spiritual duality.
- 2) For the Indo-European people the personal act is not free, but merely imitative of divine archetypes. For example, if a marriage is to be contracted, it is not a personal act, but rather an imitative act of a god who married a qualified goddess (Dussel, 1978, p. 39). Furthermore, since the personal act is not free, the evil in the world is caused by a god. On the other hand, for the Semitic people the human being is autonomous since he has free will. In this way, evil does not come from some god, but its first cause is the freedom of the human being.¹
- 3) While for the Indo-European people the human being must escape from the body and in contemplation achieve perfection, for the Semitic people the human being must live intersubjectivity as a commitment to the Other. It is there, in taking responsibility for the Other, where the human being can achieve perfection. In the words of Dussel (1978):

¹ As Dussel (1978) expresses, for the Semitic world “freedom is not of the body or of the soul, but of the human in its totality, as an autonomous being. The Adamic myth wants to explain the mystery of the origin of evil. The Semites—unlike the Indo-Europeans who attribute evil to a god or to the body—write this account of the origin of evil to show that this evil is neither made by God nor is it a god, but has its cause in the freedom of the human being, that of Adam. It does not present a tragically chained Adam, but a dramatically tempted Adam, tempted in his freedom. For the Semite the body is not the origin of evil but freedom” (Dussel, p. 42).

The perfection of the Greeks is that of the sage, or, ultimately, of the contemplator; while the perfection of the Semite is that of a man who, in the community, commits himself to history, and that is the prophet. The perfection of the Semite is not that of the sage but that of the prophet. What does the prophet do? He gives his life for the liberation of the community of the poor, of the oppressed. [...] Perfection is now for the Semite, that committing himself to the liberation of the community, that giving of his life until death for that community of the poor; he is the “servant of Yahweh.” (p. 10)

- 4) The Indo-European people devalued the historical, because everything concrete is corruptible, that is, it cannot be reduced to a universal and eternal formula. On the other hand, the Semitic people discover and assume the value of history, since it is in a historical, concrete moment in which the human being can recognize and commit to the Other.

To confront what is representative of the Semitic people with the vision of the world of the Indo-European people not only facilitates understanding the clear differences between them, but also enables us to formulate a critical-political interpretation of Christianity.

Within the Roman Empire, Christianity appears as a political exteriority that assumed a preferential option for the poor and most disadvantaged of the system. It is interesting to note that Jeshúa was politically accused for having been critical of the current order. But even more interesting is to see that he was persecuted for having introduced a vision of the world where human beings and life were placed above both religious and imperial law. In Jeshúa, the Semitic intersubjectivity not only positions itself in favor of the people of the poor and oppressed, but also questions the political, economic and religious order that produces victims, and classifies it as perverse. In Christianity, therefore, the ethical-political sense of stage II is subverted. And, although the preferential option for the poor, the widow, the foreigner can be originally identified in a tradition that goes back to even the ancient Mesopotamian legal codes of stage I, for Dussel (2007), the deep ethical-political component of the messianic kingdom develops and inaugurates, in the universal historical plane, interregional stage III.

The secularization of political structures and the difference between Christianity and Christendom

Due to the subversive nature of Christianity, the followers of Jeshua, persecuted by the Roman Empire, formed communities and lived among “the displaced, immigrants, foreigners, victims of Hellenistic-Roman domination” (Dussel, 2007, p. 77). The project of these communities was not to constitute a political state, but an ethical community critical of the Empire. In this way, the slaves and victims were presented within a horizon of hope, from the exteriority of the established order. It is worth recognizing the impact of these Christian communities since, even though they were victims of the Empire, they were able generate a necessary political transformation.

The Christian community was not only autonomous within the Roman Empire, but, by opposing the gods, the divine—an important legitimator of the Empire—they were persecuted and sentenced to death, as was its founder. While the deeply religious Empire commanded the emperor to be worshiped as a god, the Christians not only showed themselves to be “atheists” of the system, but also delegitimized the unity of the Empire. Not worshiping the emperor was a political crime that members of the Christian community assumed thanks to its deep intersubjective value. Despite the

martyrdom, however, the Christian community managed to deconstruct for three centuries the religious legitimating foundations of the Empire (Dussel, 2007, p.80). The first Christian community, following the teachings of Jeshúa, demanded that the State not determine their religious life; in other words, it secularized the State, which deprived it of religious legitimacy.

Although primitive Christian communities were managers of the secularization of political structures, as stated by Dussel (2007), this result gradually ceased with the arrival of Constantine in 324 CE. The majority presence of Christians in the East, in Greece, in Coptic and Alexandrian Egypt, in Anatolia (the most populous region of the Empire) and Seleucid Antioch, would no longer be under threat of persecution. Possibly for political reasons, Constantine inaugurated the Christian state (Christendom) and freed the church to cloak, under an alleged Christian culture, a new sacred legitimacy of the state. Over time, Christianity became a political force, and the state used Christendom as its absolute foundation. However, the political strength of the Christian communities was largely due to having betrayed their original inspiration, collaborating with the monarchies or states in this legitimizing process. From having been a critical community, the Christian communities not only contradictorily transformed themselves into the new foundation of the State, but also legitimized the oppression of the new victims of the Christian Empire. In this way, Christianity ceased to be a mass presence, was institutionalized ecclesiastically under the hegemony of the State and betrayed the ethical-political foundation of the messianic kingdom of its founder.

However, Christianity did not completely succumb to the inauguration of Christendom. A community of Christians called the “Coptic-Byzantine Christian monasticism” opposed established Christendom and criticized the legitimacy of the state. The interesting thing is that this community, not properly belonging to the Judeo-Christian tradition, managed to maintain a critical-prophetic gaze in the midst of the Christian State and continued a preferential option for the poor of the Empire. At the same time, the message of Jeshua of Nazareth continued to be shared and assumed, causing the conversion of many members of the churches. Thus, in the midst Christendom, a critical current of collaborationism between the ecclesial institution and the Empire emerged.

Final reflection

After having noted, briefly, that the Semitic tradition marked a milestone in the inauguration of the values of freedom and personal singularity that made the emergence of stage III possible, it would be worth reflecting on the validity of these values in stage IV from which we read the past. And it is that if we want to place Latin America in universal history, we must not only recognize the constructive-progressive movement of history, but we must identify some starting points that are not necessarily evident in the immediate world in which we exist. It is as if Dussel (2007) invited us to complement our personal experience of the Americas with a universal history that takes place in a successive diachronic line. However, although our political-personal history is at times confronted with universal history, the survival of the oppressed does not depend on a mere theoretical knowledge of the Semitic and Christian tradition. Although it is true that recognizing the Semitic-Christian values of life and of political and personal intersubjectivity can and should be assumed in the midst of our Latin American reality, I understand that it is essential to understand that human beings tend towards communal life, which is the first reason that has allowed it to survive over time. So, detecting the Semitic-Christian values in the midst of our reality can serve as motivation to continue a traditional-historical legacy of recognition of the Other. Now, continuing to recognize that the critical responsibility for the Other comes from a historical legacy and a natural tendency

towards survival, shows us that we can a) know history in order to be critical of the system. and b) maintain a worldview open to the exteriority of the Other that will allow us, in turn, to evaluate our role in the midst of the system.

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The Context of Modern Politics

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The Context of Modern Politics

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Through the universal, ecumenical paths, which are so much reproached to us, we are getting closer and closer to ourselves

-José Carlos Mariátegui, 7 *Ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana*

Introduction

Under the guiding thread of a de-struction¹ of world political history, and from the position of suffering living corporality², Dussel (2007) presents the context of modern politics in the fifth section of *Política de la liberación: Historia mundial y crítica*. Modernity is not in this case a merely intra-European phenomenon that belongs to a periodization of history enunciated from the West. It is, on the contrary, a moment that arose from the experience of colonization of the non-European Other:³ “1492 will be the moment of the ‘birth’ of Modernity as a concept, the concrete moment of the ‘origin’ of a very particular ‘myth’ of sacrificial violence and, at the same time, a process of ‘covering up’ of the non-European” (Dussel, 1994, p. 8). Understanding the context of the emergence of this colonizing experience, that is to say, of the other worlds of life before and outside of this European Modernity, is the objective of this fifth section. For this, four moments are

¹ The term “destruction” is of Heideggerian inspiration. Heidegger (2012) uses the term *Destruktion* in *Sein und Zeit* (1927), within the framework of an interrogation about the sense of being (Western, Hellenic-centered), under the following terms: “If the question of Being is to have its own history made transparent, then this hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking *the question of Being as our clue*, we are to *destroy* the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which have guided us ever since” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 23). It will be Derrida who will make the term popular, understanding and using it as a “method”: “Toute déconstruction commence par deconstruire l'indivisibilité d'un seuil et la solidité d'un fondement” [All deconstruction begins by deconstructing the indivisibility of a threshold and the solidity of a foundation] (Derrida, 2008, p. 412). Unlike the German and the French, the Argentine philosopher does not carry out such a procedure within the framework of a Eurocentric ontological history (Heidegger, 2012) or a merely discursive problematization in the field of meaning and signifier that, little by little, expands towards the thematization of justice (Derrida, 1971 and 2008), but, from now on, in the ethical sphere (Dussel, 1973 and 1998) and in the political sphere (Dussel, 2007).

² “Human life that is not a concept, an idea, or an abstract horizon, but the mode of reality of each human being in particular, an absolute condition of ethics and a requirement of all liberation” (Dussel, 1998, p. 11).

³ The *Ethics of Liberation* reads: “the centrality of Europe in the “world-system” is not only the result of an internal superiority accumulated in the European Middle Ages over other cultures, but also the effect of the simple fact of discovery, conquest, colonization and integration (subsumption) of Amerindia (fundamentally) that will give Europe the decisive *comparative sale* over the Ottoman-Muslim world, India or China. Modernity is the fruit of this event and not its cause” (Dussel, 1998, p. 51). In the first volume of *Politics of Liberation*, it is noted: “the beginning of Modernity should be redefined. It would be necessary to introduce Spain and Portugal (the “southern Europe” for Hegel, which is not for him, nor for the enlightened ones of the “northern Europe”, properly Europe, nor modern), since the invasion of America in 1492, in to modernity. With this, Spain would be redefined as the first “modern” State, and Latin America, since the conquest, would be the first colonial territory of the indicated Modernity. Modern, then, insofar as it is the barbarian “other face” that Modernity needs for its definition. If this were so, the Spanish and Portuguese philosophers (although they practiced a philosophy of scholastic stamp, but due to its modern content) and the first great Latin American thinkers of the 16th century should be considered as the beginning of the philosophy of Modernity. Before Descartes or Spinoza (both wrote in Amsterdam, a Spanish province until 1610, and studied with Spanish teachers), a Bartolomé de Las Casas, Ginés de Sepúlveda, Francisco de Vitoria or a Francisco must be considered in the history of modern political philosophy. Suarez. They would be the first modern political philosophers, before Bodin, Hobbes or Locke” (Dussel, 2007, pp. 12-13).

addressed in the text: China, the Ottoman Empire, pre-modern and eastern Venice, the Italian Renaissance.

The question of the importance of China

China is not only neglected in the traditional Eurocentric discourse—which Hegel (2005) exemplifies and synthesizes, but does not exhaust: Europe as the “end and center of world history”—but also in the contemporary proposal of the *World-System* by Wallerstein (1979). By contrast, a trans-modern perspective,⁴ which includes, in a non-Eurocentric mode, moments that were not incorporated in European Modernity, will have to consider the place of China in world history.

Based on the text by Menzies (2003), it is stated in *Política de la Liberación* (2007) that it was China that made trips to the Atlantic and the eastern South Pacific, as well as mapped these areas on two maps long before Europeans could do so. And, starting with Frank (1998), it is pointed out: “China was until the seventeenth century the greatest power in merchandise production, and the China Sea a market center without equal in the world-system” (Dussel, 2007, p 148). In other words, with recourse from the historical materiality of China, the “evidence” of European historical supremacy is decentered here, placing Europe as peripheral in this world-system organized around Asia. Only with the brutal Indo-American colonization in 1492, Europe will be able to count on “money” (the product of the precious minerals extracted from indigenous exploitation) to “buy” in the Chinese market and thus configure a new Euro-centered world-system that will give rise to Modernity.⁵ Consequently, the rise of the Occident (“West”) can only be explained by the decline of the East (Asia). But this movement is not only the substitution of one commercial predominance for another, but, above all, the constitution of a “coloniality of power”—in terms of Quijano (2000)—that violently expropriated the colonized populations for the development of modern capitalism, repressed the original symbolic and cultural forms and forced the learning of the dominant culture, among others.

Before such a process of Eurocentric coloniality, there was a great technology outside of Europe, as well as a rich and varied philosophical reflection in China that the official discourse tends to elude. With regard to the conceptual elaboration, some authors can be mentioned: Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529), neo-Confucian of ethical-political and epistemological reflections, who thematizes the “Great learning” (Zhu Xi) whose heart is the ethical practice of the good and the noble; Li Zhi (1527-1602), a humanist thinker before the Italian Renaissance; Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695), a contemporary of Locke, who reflects on the common good, and does not ask about a hypothetical contractual origin of the State (since in China the State was a given, established since ancient times with an iron bureaucracy), but instead questions the injustice of the State against the peasant people. In short, Chinese philosophy: “advocated, by what we can classify as ‘critics,’ a ‘change’ of political institutions” (Dussel, 2007, p. 163).

⁴ Trans-Modernity is understood in this text in the following way: that historical stage that includes “moments that were never incorporated into European Modernity, and that by subsuming the best of European and North American Modernity, it will affirm ‘from outside’ itself, essential components of the excluded cultures themselves, to develop a new future politics, that of the XXI century” (Dussel, 2007, p. 145).

⁵ “Just as Greece was peripheral to the Persian-Egyptian world (before Alexander) and yet subsequently achieved hegemony with Alexandrian Hellenism, in the same way peripheral Europe will accumulate strength during early Modernity under the Hindustani and Chinese presence” (Dussel, 2007, p. 150).

In terms of the Ethics of Liberation (Dussel, 1998), China maintained the material principle (as happiness of the people) and the feasibility principle (the strategic effectiveness of its institutions), but not the formal principle, since its consensus was always oligarchic and the criticism of political conditions was carried out only under the same consensual premises.

A still ancient world: the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire is relevant for the definition of colonial Modernity since it constituted the "wall" that prevented Europe's contact with the Chinese commercial geopolitical center. It should be remembered that this empire arose as a result of the weakening of the Byzantine Empire (1071), defeated by the Seljuk Turks.

Originally the Turks, nomadic tribes par excellence, began their march west in the 6th century AD fleeing the Huns. In the 9th century they convert to Islam. Little by little they achieve military successes until they become professional warriors with weapons and techniques superior to the Byzantines and Europeans of their time. With this, the text, as it had already done with China, once again calls into question the "evidence" of European technological and war superiority per se. Finally, Mehmet II (1451-1481) manages to unify the various tribes, constituting the Ottoman Empire. The decisive historical feat of this will be the siege of Constantinople in 1453 thus replacing the Byzantine Empire and obtaining the possession of extensive geographical areas that involves Asia Minor, North Africa and the Balkan area of Europe.

In political terms, this new empire adopted the political organization of the Byzantine Empire, although combining it with its original model of sultanates. Regarding the cultural sphere, the Turks also assimilated another model, the Greek disciplinary division, teaching the Muslim elite logic (Aristotelian), metaphysics, grammar, rhetoric, geometry, mathematics, etc.

With the decline of the use of the Mediterranean Sea and the rise of the use of the Atlantic Ocean, the Ottoman Empire will go into decline until finally being completely defeated, in the 19th century, by the English and the French.

Venice: an "eastern" political system in peripheral Europe

Venice develops, with its own characteristics, in the European Middle Ages. It was a "republic" with an important shipping trade system. It is relevant for its influence on the Italian Renaissance. Originally it was inhabited by primitive "patricians", between the 5th and 6th centuries AD, grouped around a *consiglio* (council). During its dependence on the Byzantine Empire, in the 9th century AD, Venice will possess a unique authority: the *Doge* (*duce*, conductor).

Unlike the medieval logic of land dependence on a feudal lord, in Venice there was full power over the plots by those who built the dwellings, since they were built "in the sea". In this way, "The Venetian citizen lived and defended his *libertà* in a *vivere civile* of great autonomy" (Dussel, 2007, p. 168). These patricians without dependency could thus be grouped into a civil commune ruled by a *Maggiore Consiglio* and by a *Minore Consiglio*. Another important civil body was the *Quarantia civil vecchia*, which dealt with commercial administrative matters. Then in 1229 other administrative devices emerged: the *Consiglio de' Pregati* which later became, in 1310, the *Consiglio de' Dieci* assuming functions similar to those of a "senate." Consequently, "Modern democracy, therefore, will have its original inspiration in the 'Orient,' in the eastern Mediterranean" (Dussel, 2007, p. 169).

With this, the text once again calls into question the official Eurocentric narrative about an idealized Greek democracy that would connect, without interruption, with a later European democracy. In ethical terms, Venetian politics shows a strong communal consensuality: “It has gone from ‘prudence’ guided by areté (as subjective ‘virtue’) to communitarian consensuality of secularized public ‘institutions’ of legitimation (the ‘virtue’ of the Republic). Venice is the “bridge” between the ancient world (Greek, Roman, Byzantine) and Modernity, without being yet “modern” (Dussel, 2007, p. 171).

Also, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the ascendancy of the use of the Atlantic Ocean by part of an already modern Europe will mean the decline of this city located "on" the sea.

The Italian Renaissance: Machiavelli

The Italian Renaissance, a moment of return to "classical" studies, is assumed by the text as a pre-modern moment in as much as it predates European coloniality. It is in this context where Machiavelli's reflection is situated.

The work of the Italian author is situated at three levels:

a) by recommending to the politician a properly strategic way of proceeding, he enables the use of practical-political reason (at the level of the struggle for hegemony) against the old concept of virtue (Greek arete); b) taking as an example the ancient Venetian or Roman "republic" against the pontifical monarchy, he opens the wide field of a new institutionality of the State (at the level of the institutions); c) when studying the ancient Roman religion (as opposed to that of Christianity) as an example to be imitated, it tries to go looking for a new type of legitimacy (at the level of principles, not already sacral but secularized) (Dussel, 2007, p. 173)

It is in these areas where Machiavelli will wonder about the Italian political instability, particularly in Florence. Two concepts are used for this questioning: *fortuna*, that refers to the unpredictability of events, and *virtù*, which, as a specific attitude and rationality of political actors, is adequately articulated with the continuity of political institutions. In *The Prince*, as is known, Machiavelli will project both concepts in the figure of an Italian condottier in order to refound the political order.

Now, Dussel (2007) interprets Machiavelli's concept of virtue as the “charisma” of a “popular leader:”

I think that the virtù that Machiavelli describes is the quality or characteristic of the «political charisma», of the charismatic politician—in the Weberian sense—, which opposes the traditional dominance (and legitimacy), and even the institutional one when it has been corrupted, because it is a founder and not a citizen (p. 178)

In terms of representative politics, there is also talk of the need for rhetoric on the part of this leader and the strategic theatricality of his positions and actions. In this way politics, understood as a

process of popular constitution (*potentia*),⁶ is connected to the charismatic and unifying quality of the political leader.

Machiavelli also speaks of the relationship between civil and military life, since to protect civil liberties it is necessary to exercise the office of arms: "The *vivere civile* is then political and military" (Dussel, 2007, p. 183).

In short, political corruption, the antithesis of virtue, is interpreted by Dussel as the degradation of the *ethos* of the people.⁷ Hence, virtue is not only reserved for the conductor, but also for the entire people.

Some problematizations about the historical approach and the Dusselian assumptions

Dussel's journey is significant insofar as he presents historical moments alien to European Modernity, which makes it possible to besiege the official historicist discourse that makes Europe the center of world events. However, at least three critical observations should be made.

The first: the elision of India. The text, after finishing with China, adds succinctly in a footnote that reads: "Everything said about China should be extended to Hindustan, under the Mughals and other prosperous kingdoms of India, and to Southeast Asia. But unfortunately we cannot expose this topic so as not to extend ourselves too much" (Dussel, 2007, p. 164). However, this should not avoid referring to specialized bibliography on the subject and include a note that provides concreteness and specificity to the historical-political particularities of that region. It is not clear here exactly what is extrapolated from China to India: Criticism of bureaucracy? The political modes of organization? An elision of this type is even more striking knowing the rich complexity of the philosophical thought of the region (Cfr, Tola & Dragonetti, 2008) that cannot be simply subsumed in a mere replica or Chinese extrapolation.

Second, the question of the *politics of representation*. In Dussel's discussion of Machiavelli, the author stops to extol the figure of the political leader: "The charismatic politician is such, above all, thanks to the complicity of the people, since there is a tacit alliance [...] between the charismatic and the people" (Dussel, 2007, p. 178). However, is there not here a politics of re-presentation in the sense

⁶ In the second volume of *Politics of Liberation*, Dussel (2009) explains that it is naked human life and its will to live that originates political power (*potentia*): "Human life, the mode of reality of intersubjective corporeality and community, wants-to live; that 'wanting' is the will as the 'power of life'" (p. 58). Subsequently, this human life, which refers only to the political community of living intersubjectivities as sovereign—"the *potentia* is the power of the political community itself; is (a) the plurality of all wills (material moment) or of the hegemonic majority, (b) united by consensus (formal discursive moment), and that (c) has instrumental means to exercise its power-put mediations (moment of mediations, of feasibility)" (Dussel, 2009, p. 60)—originates political power as institutionalized mediation (*potestas*).

⁷ In *20 Tesis de Política*, Dussel (2006) understands political corruption as a fetishization of power: "The original corruption of the political, which we will call the fetishism of power, consists in the fact that the political actor (the members of the political community, be it citizen or representative) believes he can affirm his own subjectivity or the institution in which he fulfills some function (hence he can be called an 'official')—be it president, deputy, judge, governor, military, police as the seat or the source of political power" (p. 13). In the second volume of *Política de la liberación* Dussel writes: "It is shown that institutional power (*potestas*) exercises by designation a power (*imperium*) that by its nature is delegated. If the *potestas* is claimed to be sovereign, a fetishistic inversion is committed. In this case, the institution has been absolutized, and in order to claim to exercise power from within it must 'weaken' the power of the community (*potentia*). With this, the institutional power (*potestas*) really 'diminishes'" (Dussel, 2009, p. 62).

that the leader is the one who represents the people?⁸ Seyhan (1992) shows for example that the concept of representation (*Repraesentatio*, *Vorstellung*) used intensively in Modern politics (especially romantic) becomes a phenomenon where the representative replaces the represented to the extent that its autonomous structure prevails with respect to what is represented. In *Política de la liberación: Arquitectónica* (2009), isn't this representative logic maintained by pointing out that for there to be politics proper, the *potentia* of the political community *must* be realized in the *potestas* of institutions? Does this assumption of representativity reproduce the danger of self-referential corruption? Should we maintain this modern, Hegelian logic of ontological splitting (duality)? What, then, to say about non-Western (i.e. Indigenous) political phenomena that develop outside of large representative institutions (e.g. the State) and embody more immediate social relations (Clastres 2010)? Should politics create new institutions, or on the contrary, operate above all at the micro-political level, that is, at the level of the power of the political community beyond the macro-politics of institutions?

Lastly, is politics necessarily just a matter of men? Here we must understand man in two senses: not only the male (heterosexual), but also the human being.⁹ Indeed, the politics that the text and the second volume describe is a community of *human* beings: suffering refers to the *human* being, intersubjective validity to men, and feasibility to *human* institutions. In this regard, a series of questions can be asked: Is there strategic action between men, women, other genders and the other than human? Why is there only "proximity" between humans and mere "proxemia" between men and things?¹⁰ What about non-human living beings, and, even more, the non-living? Is a non-speciesist politics of liberation possible, one that transcends the anthropocentric paradigm and reflects the heterogeneity of reality itself?

These questions invite us to continue the reflection opened by Dussel and respond to the urgent problems such as those of the macho heteropatriarchy that cannot be reduced to the West and also to refuse the anthropocentric speciesism implicit in some critical positions. At the end of the day, this pursuit does not eliminate the old paths, but creates, in turn, new paths in the theory and practice of a critical, inventive, liberating process. Multiplication before erasure; development before objection.

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⁸ For the rest, the question of the charismatic leader does not necessarily come paired up with a liberatory politics. Andrea Cavalletti in *Suggestion* (2015) clearly demonstrates how Western fascism used the figure of the charismatic leader, especially hypnotic, to develop its barbaric projects.

⁹ These themes have been developed especially by nonspecies feminism (Haraway, 1995; Adams, 2010).

¹⁰ See Dussel, 1996.

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Another first ‘Early Modernity’: Lusitanian Christianity in the face of the alterity of the African slave

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Another first 'Early Modernity': Lusitanian Christianity in the face of the alterity of the African slave

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The work of Western European historians does not help us look beyond the limits of this part of the world, and their American colleagues, still often trapped in borders inherited from the 19th century, do not bring us any fresh air.

-Serge Gruzinski, *As quatro partes do mundo*

Introduction

I bring to the discussion observations based on the reading of sections 6 and 7 of Enrique Dussel's *Política de Liberación: Historia mundial y crítica* and on personal reflections that arise from my research and teaching activities. This text is divided into two parts. In the first, I highlight some fundamental aspects of the book under study. As each member of the seminar was able to read Dussel's work in advance, it seemed more pertinent to make a general comment directed mainly to the question of periodization and the conceptual and temporal landmarks of Modernity, without seeking to synthesize the positions of the authors discussed in the book. It is, therefore, more of a dialogue with Dusselian ideas than a brief exposition on these sections of *Politics*. In the second part, I analyze the implications of the "decolonizing turn" for the teaching of philosophy. Despite taking the Brazilian experience as a point of reference, I believe that the points raised, at least in part, are valid for other contexts in which philosophy is taught. The text has no systematic intention. I chose to take notes to stimulate discussion.

Part I: The first nascent modernity

In sections 6 and 7 Dussel attacks the seventh limit of the history of politics that he had indicated in the prologue of *Política de Liberación I*, namely: the non-inclusion of Latin America in Modernity. In this way, he promotes a critique of the foundations of Eurocentric modernity, changes its origin and reveals its dependence on other parts of the world (Latin America and Africa) and even on undervalued regions of Europe itself (Spain and Portugal) which are often ignored in political philosophy.

Política de Liberación I develops and deepens what the philosopher raised in previous works—I would highlight, for example, *1492: El encubrimiento del otro* and *Ética de la Liberación*. If in the first work fundamental theses on the critique of the Eurocentric conception of modernity are launched, in the second, these theses are further developed (mainly in the introduction). *Política de Liberación I* pursues the critical-reconstructive task, now focused on the political dimension, but with implications that go beyond the scope of political philosophy.

Dussel highlights the concrete historical dynamics of the European economic, political and military expansion to rethink the origins of Modernity. He highlights the importance of Spain and Portugal, since they were the colonialist nations that inaugurated a concrete world history. This fact, which occurred at the end of the 15th century and consolidated in the 16th, however, did not solely have material implications. In the author's opinion, there is a whole philosophical reflection (Bartolomé de Las Casas, Ginés de Sepúlveda, Francisco de Vitória, Francisco Suárez) that wonders about the legitimacy or not of the conquest, questioning its ethical and political aspects (colonial slavery, the

dominion over foreign territories, the nature of the Other—indigenous, black) that will be ignored by the usual narrative of the history of philosophy. Therefore, he states:

The 16th century is no longer a time of the “Middle Ages” but the first century of Modernity. It is early Modernity in its first stage, that of a Europe that begins its “opening” to a “new world” that “re-connects” it (from the Atlantic to the Pacific) with part of the “old world”, Asia, constituting the first “world system”. This 16th century is the “key” and the “bridge”, now modern, between the “ancient world” and the finished formulation of the paradigm of the “modern world”. (Dussel, 2007, p. 193)

The implication of this for the history of philosophy is the following: philosophical production in the Iberian Peninsula in the 16th century is not a mere medieval atavistic vestige that stands in contrast to the novelty of the Renaissance. For Dussel, “the Spanish and Portuguese philosophers (although they practiced a philosophy of scholastic stamp, but, modern in its content) and the first great Latin American thinkers of the 16th century [for example, Guamán Poma de Ayala] should be considered as the *beginning of the philosophy of Modernity*” (2007, p. 13). They would express the original experience of constituting the first world system.

The modern era reconfigures identities, creates classifications, establishes relationships of a new kind and a new (planetary) scale. The philosophy of the new era is steeped in this process. It does not appear ready and finished, nor does it appear out of nowhere in the seventeenth century with Cartesian subjectivity. There is a whole process during the 16th century that allows a new model (scientific, philosophical, political) to be formulated in the following century. “The seventeenth century is already the fruit of the sixteenth century; Holland, France and England represent the greatest development on the horizon opened by Portugal and Spain. Latin America enters Modernity (long before North America) as the ‘other face’, dominated, exploited, covered over” (Dussel, 2005, p. 30). In the diachronic development of modernity, therefore, appears the Renaissance, the Conquest of Latin America, the Protestant Reformation, the Catholic Reform, the Scientific Revolution, the English bourgeois revolutions, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, etc. Modernity develops from the 16th to the 18th century through unknown spaces (Latin America, Caribbean, Iberian Peninsula, Africa) of the Eurocentric paradigm—without excluding the spaces (central, northern Europe and the Italian peninsula) included in it.

In this sense, Dussel understands the beginning of modernity in two moments.¹ He points out the first as marked by Hispanic-American and Portuguese Christianity (the first “early modernity”) and the second as composed by Christianities of northern Europe (the second “early modernity”). Here it is important to address that first moment. The first early Modernity dates back to the 16th century and part of the 17th. It dates back to the Spanish and Portuguese Empires (predominantly the former), is the beginning of the world-system, and has in the exploration of Latin America a first accumulation of capital on a world scale that will allow Europe, at a later stage, to leave its peripheral condition in relation to the East (India and China) and consolidate itself against the Muslim world. The birth of modernity is also marked “from a Eurocentric affirmation of the West and from an

¹ The division of Modernity changes somewhat when comparing the *Ethics of Liberation* and the *Politics of Liberation I*. In this the philosopher re-elaborates the division of modernity in three phases: early (in two moments), mature and late. As Pansarelli (2015, p. 66) points out, there is a chronological coincidence between the first modernity (in Ethics) and the first early modernity (in Politics), as well as between the second modernity (in Ethics) and the second early modernity, modernities mature and late (in Politics).

exclusive denial of two historical modes of Exteriority” (Dussel, 2007, p. 186): the alterity of the native American inhabitant and the African slave. As the philosopher points out, the modern *ego cogito* (the Cartesian “I think”) was preceded by more than a century by the *ego conquiro* (the practical Hispanic-Portuguese “I conquer”) that imposed its will and covered over other subjectivities. And as Restrejo and Rojas (2010) highlight when commenting on this point: “The subjectivity derived from the experience of the discoverer and conqueror is the first modern subjectivity that places Europeans as the center and end of history” (p. 85). In this way, Dussel shows how the politics of this first early modernity became the foundation of modern metaphysics itself: “It is the concretion that generates abstraction, physics determines metaphysics, as opposed to the philosophical discourse itself that will become unique in Modernity—or rather, when the second Modernity [according to the classification of *Política*, the second ‘Early Modernity’ and ‘Mature Modernity’] acquires an air of unique Modernity” (Pansarelli, 2015, p. 66).

Concluding this first part, I would like to highlight, in a synthetic way, some points of the Dusselian vision to stimulate the debate:

- 1) The change in relation to the role of Portugal. In Ethics, Portugal is in the antechamber² of modernity, in *Política*, the Portuguese expansion over Africa and the Portuguese slavery policy are already considered as “another first nascent modernity” that covers over the alterity of the African slave.
- 2) The displacement of the geographical axis of philosophical thought: the exit from the Mediterranean to the South Atlantic.
- 3) The impact of the question of Otherness in European philosophy, exemplified in the reflections of Francisco de Vitória and Francisco Suárez.
- 4) The process of real consciousness exposed in the change of perspective of Bartolomé de Las Casas in relation to the enslaved black African.
- 5) The incorporation of the voice of the oppressed, giving it a philosophical character, valuing the testimony of Guamán Poma de Ayala.
- 6) The constitutive dimension (and not only conjunctural) of coloniality in the “classics of political thought” represented in the Lockean justification of slavery.

Part II: Implications of the decolonization journey for the teaching of philosophy

It is known that Hegel collaborates both from the theoretical and practical point of view, in the emergence of the history of philosophy as a disciplinary field and as an essential component of the teaching of philosophy. The German philosopher not only wrote an influential history of philosophy but worked effectively to make the discipline stick to the philosophical curriculum (see Hegel, 2000), shaping a standard narrative of philosophy that would be followed, more or less explicitly by many authors. In fact, the Hegelian text *Lessons on the History of Philosophy* shaped not only a history but a cartography of philosophical thought. In this work we find theses formulated that are frequently repeated in didactic books, expert texts and specialized works, such as: the Greek origin of philosophy and its radical difference with oriental wisdom; Latin scholasticism as the main chapter of medieval philosophy; empiricism and rationalism as the central clash of modern thought or references to the great philosophers who marked eras such as Socrates, Descartes, and Kant.

² “With Portugal we are in the antechamber, but not yet in Modernity or in the ‘world-system’ (the IV stage of the system that originated, at least, between Egypt and Mesopotamia)” (Dussel, 1998, p. 55).

As you read Hegel's history of philosophy, you can see how certain platitudes of philosophy taught today maintain this narrative, with its emphases, exclusions, and silences. Examples of this are: the absence of *filósofas* (women philosophers); the valorization of a metaphysical lineage; the exclusion of Asia, Africa, Latin America and part of Europe (the so-called southern part of the continent, Portugal and Spain), considered as childhood spaces of reason (Asia), of obsolete reason (Portugal and Spain, which would maintain in full modernity a scholasticism that has already expired) or without reason (Africa and Latin America).

Recognizing the impact of the Hegelian historical understanding (see Park 2013; Beiser, 2017), it is not surprising that today a whole philosophical training can be carried out or come into contact with the most varied texts and philosophical problems without engaging female philosophers (sporadically at best), with philosophers from other regions of the planet (especially those located in the South of the world), or with important issues of the reality and history of places such as Latin America or Africa (for example, the issues of racism, colonialism, slavery). Enrique Dussel's critique raises questions about the history of philosophy, questioning its periodization, characterizations, and theoretical frameworks. It shows how a Eurocentric vision has constituted a historical and interpretative paradigm, which ends up excluding other references and concealing, under a supposed rationality, historical subjects and thoughts that do not fit into Eurocentric molds and that denounce the barbarism perpetrated in the name of reason, modernity and western civilization.

Dussel affirms that history in general, and the history of philosophy in particular, are based on the Eurocentrism of modernity, which confuses the concrete globality hegemonized by Europe as the “center” of the world with abstract universality. That is to say, a certain vision of the world and of history that he sees in the knowledge, institutions, values and social forms that emerged in Europe (and also in the United States) the pattern that is to be followed by other parts of the world; it is not the result of a greater rationality, but rather a change in power relations in the world, which goes back to the processes of colonization and military, economic, and cultural domination of regions and peoples of America, Africa and Asia. In this sense, the conventional narrative of the history of philosophy—in practice reduced to the list of schools, currents and authors of the European tradition—cannot be conceived as the pure and simple expression of philosophical universality. It is necessary to consider the power relations that allowed such a narrative, and no other, to become the official history of philosophy.

The Dusselian proposal—a criticism of Eurocentrism present in current histories—is to reconstruct the history of philosophy from a truly global and critical perspective. It is global in that it brings to the philosophical debate contexts, texts, problems, and authors that were previously forgotten, ignored or silenced and that reveal other views on issues that disturb humanity (such as existence, death, the relationship with the other, forms of social organization, etc.) or phenomena that have affected and affect everyone's life (such as modernity, globalization, the environmental crisis, etc.).

In this way, Dussel promotes a decentralization of the beginning of the history of philosophy, incorporating the philosophical reflections of other peoples of antiquity (peoples of Bantu Africa, Semites of the Middle East, Chinese, Indians and also Aztecs and Incas) as well as Greeks and Romans, broadens the notion of the Middle Ages by including Arab, Jewish and Byzantine philosophies as autonomous forms and not mere appendages of Latin Christian philosophy, demonstrates Modernity as a time of concealment of the Other (indigenous, black), to whom it denies its Otherness and its reason in the name of a supposedly universal exclusionary reason. It discusses contemporary globalization as a phenomenon that produces exclusion. The turn that

Dussel presents is a "decolonizing turn of history", a critical counter-narrative, a general look with a new periodization and inclusion of themes not studied or discarded by the Eurocentric gaze in the official history of philosophy.

Dussel indicates in several works the importance of the Hegelian conception of history for the formulation of Eurocentrism. Following in his footsteps, I believe that the role of the history of Hegelian philosophy should also be noted for the construction of the hegemonic account of the history of philosophy that is the basis of curricula, manuals and teaching programs. In the introduction to the *Lessons in the History of Philosophy*, Hegel presented the dividing lines in the history of philosophy and provides the general map of philosophical reason. In a passage—summarized here for the historical period under discussion—the German philosopher sets out the main milestones of philosophical history and briefly characterizes modernity:

The history of philosophy, therefore, is divided into the three periods of Greek philosophy, the philosophy of the intermediate time and the philosophy of modern time...The philosophy of modern times was consolidated only in the time of the Thirty Years' War [1618-1648], with Bacon, Jacob Boehme and Descartes, beginning with the distinction contained in *Cogito, ergo sum*. This period chronologically still includes some centuries and, therefore, this philosophy is, however, something new. (2000, p. 452-3)

Without being able to develop the details implicit in this quote, I sketch in a table the main points of the history of modern philosophy present in Hegel, inscribing in the left column the fundamental facts and currents indicated and treated by him. In the right column, I list, in parallel, the forgotten events and currents of the Hegelian narrative (and of the hegemonic philosophical narrative) and that, since the Dusselian “decolonizing turn”, should be taken into account for a broader and more comprehensive analysis and for a more critical understanding of the history of modern philosophy.

Modernity / Coloniality in the History of Modern Philosophy

MODERNITY	COLONIALITY
Liberty	Racial slavery
Protestant Reformation	Catholic Reformation or Counter-Reformation
Scientific Revolution	<i>Ratio Studiorum</i>
Renaissance	Second scholastic
Rationalism and empiricism	Colonial philosophy (scholastic and baroque)
Nation states	Colonies
Revolutions (England, France)	Haitian Revolution
Enlightenment	Racism / Racialism
	Amerindian philosophies (Nahuatl, Mayan, Inca, Guarani, among others) and African peoples (both in Africa and in the diaspora)

The function of this table is merely indicative. I leave it at the end of this text as a provocation, since it allows us to synthetically capture what enters and what does not enter into the traditional narrative of modernity. With this provocation I close these notes and, I hope, I have stimulated all of the participants of the seminar for the debate.

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Poietics of the Second Early Modernity: Political Ontology of the Christianities of Northern Europe (1630-1789)

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Poietics of the Second Early Modernity: Political Ontology of the Christianities of Northern Europe (1630-1789)

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Introduction

In this paper I reflect on the political ontology configuration of early modernity in northern Europe in order to examine the production of reality and subjectivity involved in this process. This idea is the one that is presented as a *poietic* or productive force, both technical and procreative, following Veraza's (2012) interpretation of Marx. Based on this conceptual approach, we will analyze the theoretical and historical revision that Dussel proposes on the topic of the Christianities of northern Europe between 1630 and 1789. Indeed, in this post-Hispanic scenario, in which the incidence of the community as “consensus of the communities” becomes more and more distant, the influence of late feudalism persists in continental Europe, together with the growing importance of Dutch and British mercantilism. The instrumental need for political institutionalization is thus insurmountable according to the legitimacy of the nascent modern state and state rationality. Therefore, the pre-industrial mercantile bourgeoisie pushes ever harder for the unification of political and military power, around the sovereignty of the king, in order to organize an ever larger and more significant market for its unrestricted cravings for wealth and economic accumulation. However, behind the dominant economic liberalism and its formalistic, fetishistic (narcotic) political ontology, a potential of exteriority can be seen in hiding around the republican common and the idea of popular sovereignty that would be important to consider, through a political, critical and strategic translation, in the transmodern context present in our contemporary historical-political horizon.

Negative poietics and the foundation of political sovereignty

In this first instance, the theoretical approaches of Jean Bodin (1529-1596) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) stand out. In Bodin's case, in his work *The Six Books of the Republic*, he is already situated in a scenario in which the nascent mercantile bourgeoisie begins to dominate with the intention of shaping a monarchical order based on sovereign power, that is, an absolute power, indivisible, of command and perpetual order. Dussel (2007) clearly makes explicit what is proposed here as a *negative poietics*, where “the origin of power [is] interpreted as primary *negativity*” (p. 243). Hence, the emergence of the idea “citizenship” in the origin of the republics refers only to: “a simple subject obtaining the *sovereignty of another*” (p. 243).

The notion of sovereignty (“*super omnia*”, the “above all” or supreme power) is the very source of politics and is fully manifest in the figure of the monarch. Bodin maintains that: “sovereignty is the *absolute and perpetual power* of a Republic, which the Latins called *majestatem*, the Greeks *ákhebran ékousian* or *kurían arkhé*” (p. 244). Therefore, it is necessary that “those who are *sovereign* are not subject in any way to the *command of another* and that they can give the laws to their subjects” (p. 244). At this point it is evident how the condition of sovereignty configured from this *negative poietics* crystallizes at the level of potestas/institutionalization (monarch) necessarily from the negation of the Other, the living community, the *potentia*. So then, the sovereign is not under the command of the Other, but not only in relation to the idea of government or control and also to any regulations that come from the material-formal link with the Other. Consequently, the genesis of the negative poietics of sovereignty is consummated in a “monarch (who) is *separate* from the people” (p. 244), settling this

division into a constituent characteristic of the republic. Thus, there are two parts or political horizons: “on the one hand, the one with sovereignty, and on the other, the people” (p. 244).

In the case of the thought of Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, a new epistemic model was launched in the seventeenth century, fully correlated with the new modern epistemic regime (or the classical order of knowledge, according to Foucault (2002)) based on the dominance of the order of the representation, of the signification, of the signs or *mathesis*, measure and *ratio*, above the world of “things,” of the sensible (holistic) historical referents of the space of experiences of a determined community. In the field of political ontology, Hobbes is the first to formalize this new paradigm. According to Dussel, the crucial argument in Hobbes revolves around a *solipsistic model*, founded on passions, on the horizon of *aesthesis* and sensible *pathos*, rather than on the Cartesian universe of reason and where the *power* of the force of the human being comes from a:

...‘state of nature’ and not from the civility of the subject, since it allowed the king to exercise power, restricting the use of his and remaining in some way as defenseless, thanks to the contract based on the common interest in the survival of all, which gave legitimacy on a new basis to the state, civil institutions and political action. (p. 246)

In effect, the restriction of the subject is their subtraction or negative poietics embodied in his condition of being defenseless or devitalized.

From this conceptual panorama emerges an imaginary (poietic) construction of the “state of nature” originating from the secularization of the *leit motiv* of “earthly paradise” (or ideal state). Dussel analogically replaces the “‘earthly paradise’ (...) with a *hypothetical* ‘state of nature’, which also relates to a certain ‘right’ or ‘natural law’ prior to the positive law dictated in a given empirical political order” (p. 309, n. 648). Dussel associates this hypothetical remission with the *method* established by Hobbes, specifically with the “counter-factual” levels as “regulative ideas” or criteria of orientation for praxis (categorical frames). The *rhetorical* dimension that the hypothesis of the “state of nature” acquires operates in the approach as a horizon of negative meaning. Nevertheless, the concomitant eclipsing displayed by this negative poietics goes against the grain of the chaotic English situation of the moment (as a concrete referential or historical horizon), portrayed in the hypothetical notion of “state of nature.” For Dussel this is a rhetorical device that is highly effective in the process of validating a hypothesis. It thus becomes an argumentative “resource.”

The nucleus of Hobbes’s argument on the state of nature finally realizes that: “individual benefit is the measure of right” (p. 248). According to this approach, “nature” has created human beings placing them in a “state of nature”, with a “right of nature” (or *ius naturale*) based around the freedom that each subject at their disposal: “his own power as he wishes, for the preservation of his (...) own life and under a ‘law of nature’ or *lex naturalis*” (p. 248). However, the emphasis on a solipsist power of this type, whose germ is located in the capitalist matrix of economic production, potentially leads to the arbitrary and unrestricted deployment of productive forces that are rather technical (than procreative), linked to physical reality and the new paradigm of modern instrumental science.

In Hobbes’s, the “state of nature” corresponds to a negative and original stage. The poietic construction configured here implies the inversion of a major premise where “the individual is entirely free, with all rights (and) without any property” (p. 249). Indeed, the postulated alteration refers to the fact that “having all the rights and freedoms, being equally selfish, *everyone fights against*

everyone and the preservation of life becomes impossible” (p. 249). This inversion is enthroned in the regulative idea of this negative poietics, in the fact that what could be an ideal state of “positivity” for the anti-conservative utopians turns out to be, under the signature of the *bellum omnium contra omnes* (war of all against all), its radical opposite: the figure of negativity, distance and inversion.

Thus, the fact that power is *transferred* or *renounced* by each individual is added to this political ontology. Hobbes no longer has the community as his starting point. As Dussel puts it: “each human being is like a *monad* (...) that when moving can be attracted to other mobiles, collide with them or be repulsed by others” (p. 249). So, from the Newtonian principle of his mechanistic materialism, each individual as a “mobile body” enjoys a primordial extreme freedom, establishing in this principle a complete analogy between a physical epistemic/categorical model and a political one. Freedom is conceptualized here as the “*absence* of external impediments, impediments that frequently reduce part of the power that a human being has to do what he wants” (p. 249). Thus the human being is moved by an immanent force linked to perpetual motion (*perpetuum mobile*) as a fundamental postulate. For this reason, the central Hobbesian argument “can be reduced in its essence to *removing* ‘resistance’ or ‘impediment’ from the sovereign” (p. 250). This restriction or resignation of the individual—which is added to the negativity, distancing and inversion mentioned— entails a “*transfer*, as soon as the resignation is deposited in the will of another chosen one, the sovereign (the king). It is not properly a ‘transfer’ (as a positive act), but rather a *prohibition, refusal, restriction, impeding, not offering resistance, ‘giving free reign’* to the will of the sovereign” (p. 250). A sort of “second nature” (or *civil society* from this negative poietics) is configured in the act of transferring their right or legal representation on the basis of the *contract* (pact/agreement), where citizens or subjects “renounce to exercise their force, they cease to prevent, with their power, the exercise of sovereign power, and this is precisely the content of the contract, which states that only the sovereign (the king) is allowed to exercise his freedom as ‘political power’”(p. 251).

Poietics, the market, and modern political universalism

Spinoza's political thought, his way of conceiving the political ontology of a modernity in consolidation, is characterized by being configured, like in Hobbes, from the subjectivity driven by human passions on an affective level. In his *theological-political treatise* he presents a mature reflection on the foundations of politics, taking as a point of reference “natural needs,” “natural law” and the “state of nature” (p. 260). Thus, Spinoza maintains that “by law and *natural* institution (*institutum naturae*) I do not understand anything other than the rules of the nature of each individual, according to which we conceive of each of them naturally determined to *exist and act* in a certain way” (p. 260). The idea of “nature” is in turn a specific configuration as “*natura naturata*” or being created as a mode or attribute of God. Under this prism, the same naturalistic and mechanistic logic of Hobbes is observed, in which “the right of every individual extends as far as his power extends (from which) it follows that each individual has a sovereign right to this (...), that is, to exist and act as determined by their nature” (p. 260).

A fundamental element in Spinoza's argument is that “the natural right of every human being is not determined by sound reason, but by desire and power” (p. 261). In this sense, “healthy reason” carries a *narcotic* dimension (*pharmacological poietics*), since deep down it is not natural, and as in stoicism, what is produced ultimately is only a “managing” or subsumption of desire (p. 261). Thus, in the “state of nature” human beings “have to live and preserve themselves according to the impulse of *appetites*, as long as they *can*, since nature did not give them anything else, denying them the ability to live according to the *healthy reason*” (p. 261). Here Spinoza's poietics is based on the

referential horizon of passion and power, but always having as a compositional model (*poietic*) the general and universal framework of “healthy reason” present in the civil state or political order. For Spinoza “the human being under natural laws alone, in the first place and solipsistically, is determined (...) to necessarily act under the impulses of (...) (*conatus esse conserndi*) who acts while he can” (p. 261). However, according to Dussel, this premise is a matter of “practical ‘feasibility’, a moment eminently proper to strategic reason. It is a ‘power to act’ *technically* (not a normative ‘duty to act’)” (p. 261).

The decisive point proposed in Spinoza's thought, and which is distinctive of his own way of composing a poietic as the foundation of his political ontology, lies in locating the *conatus* already in the space of historical experiences of the market, “as a *modus vivendi* in which, *materially*, human nature was conceived as empirically individual and with appetites or passions (affections) that, in that state of nature, are governed by the principle of the struggle for the *conservation* of one's own being” (p. 261). Dussel emphasizes that the *conatus*/market (survival of the strongest) transforms into the “reality” (primary referential horizon of his poietics) from which he formulates an ad hoc utopian model (p. 262). Consequently, the recourse provided in his argumentation reflects that “the hypothetical formalism of the initial model of modern political philosophy is founded on the formal economic experience of the market elevated to the status of human universal reality itself, ‘prior’ to the existence of the political community” (p. 262).

Spinoza then postulates the need to constitute a rational “civil state” that is not the consummation of the state of nature, but of the “*rational drive*’ (*conatus esse conservando*), but now from the *political order*” (p. 263). At this point, a poietic transmutation of the fundamental referential order is expounded—a *pathos* that is no longer natural but civil—in which the civil state and the contract are configured as the core elements of its theoretical-political model, radically excluding communal intersubjectivity (poietic procreative forces). The civil “pact” or “properly political” *is not natural*. In effect, the reason for the pact is the greater *utility* of the pactants. Thus: “all natural regulations are *discarded*; but even in politics, all moral normativity properly so called will be *denied*, since an absolute primacy is given to instrumental reason” (p. 264). Thus, the growing *utilitarianism* of the Spinozian pact is configured, far from all natural normativity (communal positivity) and already involved with the productive efficiency and profitability of instrumental, capitalist mercantile rationality.

What is revealed at this point is that “it is thus abandoned to attribute some force, some power, natural right or some *normativity* to the consensuality of the pact, which now *stands* before and above the defenseless solipsist individuality as an all-encompassing will to power” (p. 265). A *formal* understanding of the consensualism of politics is shown here. Beyond a “state of nature” governed by the natural law of the Hobbesian model, the mere formalistic/instrumental consensualism that articulates the pact of civil order is adopted as an archetypal reference of his poietics. Hence, “the ‘useful’ can only be chosen by strategic reason as its end (...) and not properly the appetites, which irrationally fighting to preserve themselves in being, end up inclining human beings to kill each other” (p. 315-16, n. 786). In this sense, the *conatus esse conservandi* of the “civil state” ended by “strangely imposing itself as the drive to reproduce the established formal or political system, which judges the Dionysian drive for transformation as the supreme perversity” (p. 265). In sum, the contractual instrumental reason of the “civil state” configures a self-regulating formal political system, *closed in on itself*, without reference to an *external reality*, *autopoietic*, and hence fetishized.

Poietics and “second state of nature:” economic liberalism and political pharmakon

With John Locke's thinking on the political community a new pact of the institutional system centered on the parliament is organized. In this more advanced phase within the historicization of modern poietics configured around political ontology, Hobbes's absolute monarchy is already *configured* as a “state of nature.” The secularization present in the primacy of the legislative power over the executive comprises a historical context marked by the first bourgeois revolution in history in 1688, materializing in broad control and leadership of the State. In his argument a radical inversion is executed. Instead of fully affirming the maxim about the fact that “all human beings are equal by nature” and “all have common goods,” the opposite is held, namely that even in the state of nature (“second state of nature”, historical modeling and political-economic) “there are *inevitable inequalities and private property*; once established, this economic institution must also be included in said ‘state of nature’”(p. 271).

The naturalization of private property is composed (poiesis) homologously as a “state of nature.” Those who do not own property or who sell their work for wages are obviously excluded here. Likewise, for the imperial and colonial commercial expansion project of England, slavery, the slave trade is required. The conquest leaves “a free way to structure a new political community by destroying the one that existed” (p. 272). Here the liberal and universal premise on “common goods” finds in the imperial enterprise still large tracts of lands whose inhabitants “did not join the rest of the human race (...) in the agreement for the use of *common money* and that remain uncultured. Wherever there is more land than is owned by its inhabitants (...), there anyone can take advantage of the uncultivated” (p. 272-73). Indeed, the appearance of money inaugurates “a second moment in the ‘state of nature’ for Locke, to which the American ‘savages’ have not yet accessed” (p. 273). Of course, the criterion set forth here is that of the *effective occupation and technical use* of the land: “the ‘zero point’ that sees without being seen (that of the Westerner, the mercantile capitalist, the colonialist, racist, sexist, etc.)” (p. 273).

Dussel argues that Locke is the modern rhetorician who provides the *ad extra* reasons to justify colonial expansion before the European moral conscience, but who in turn *ad intra* displays a “*tautological* argumentative strategy and (which) by inversion will give even more results, and will be taken as the philosophical foundation of the bourgeois political revolution as such” (p. 274). This resource has the mission of ultimately *covering up* the economic order. Thus, the notions of “state of nature” and “civil state” appear as “categories built with the function of *not showing* (...) something that is hidden behind what is shown (the ontological foundation)” (p. 275). In this way, the “political order” for Locke is a pharmacological poietic configuration that “serves to make the presupposed” economic order “not visible” (p. 275). Thus: “the economic order will be dealt with through themes typical of the ‘natural state’” (p. 275), now placing it completely in the “state of nature.” His fetishistic approach operates at this point as a “subtle *concealment* (...) (which) is always present in all of Locke's *rhetorical-argumentative* strategy” (p. 275).

The supposed political equality hides the already naturalized economic operability of conceiving “a *second moment* of the “state of nature” (where) one passes to the field that we could call economic” (p. 276). It is here where it is accepted and legitimized that “although the earth and all inferior creatures serve all men in *common*, it is no less true that each man has the *property of his own person*. We can also affirm that the effort of *his body* and the work of *his hands* are also authentically yours” (p. 276). In this aspect, the germ of instrumental rationality is observed in the reification of living corporeality, thus evidencing that “modern political economy, and Locke evidently, *fetishizes* in an objectifying

manner even subjectivity, the person itself, corporeality and work so that, *alienated*, they can be 'sold', and thereby justify that the *salary* is a moment of the 'state of nature'" (p. 277). Here the specificity of the poietic construction is radicalized and no longer encompasses only the inertial physical world of the individual monads (subjects) nor even the general scope of the conatus in the market, but a more precise figuration based on the money with which "ownership" of someone else's work is purchased.

For Locke there is a "second state of nature" in which each human being can defend his property, his life and freedom, according to the fact that "there is a *first passion* underneath everything and it is the '*anxiety to possess more* than what each which one you need, which alters the intrinsic value of things; value that depends solely on their usefulness for human life" (p. 277). Here Locke falls into "the fetishism of thinking that products have an intrinsic 'economic value' (as if they were physical properties), and shows his error without realizing it in his later phase" (p. 277). This "first passion" (or archetypal), that is, extreme greed, leads to the alteration of the "intrinsic value of things," that is, the utility present in the *use values* that decide on the life and death of humanity housed in reproductive rationality or life-death of the flesh and bone subject. Likewise, the fetishism of an ontology of value as if it were a physical property only overshadows the fact that it is a *social poiesis*, a relationality of domination and exploitation where there is finally an appropriation on behalf of what corresponds to the other.

Locke thus composes a "state of nature" as an *ad hoc* category to qualify the panorama of things prior to the bourgeois order. In this new state, human beings are no longer equal, nor do they possess the goods of the earth in common. Private property "*differentiates them definitively*, and all this 'by nature' (...) The fetishization of dominating systems 'naturalizes' historical institutions (such as property)" (p. 278). Thus, the nascent capitalist economic order is constituted as a natural scenario that the State must simply manage. For Dussel, we find here "the central thesis of liberalism, which will always try to *hide* the economic system (...) as an issue situated *a priori* in the political system. Its *invisibility is its hidden omnipotence*" (p. 278). Here the poietic marking lies in the separation between owners and non-owners. This inequality is organized institutionally from this place. In society, non-owners are politically speaking without a part. In this scenario the *formalist political fallacy* of Locke and later liberalism are embodied with all its productive force, cross dressing "all" the bourgeois owners as if they were "all" the subjects or inhabitants obliged to obey the civil contract. This is nothing more than "the class differentiation of Lockean natural law" (p. 281).

Conclusion

In this presentation, an attempt was made to reflect from the optics of poiesis or poietics, that is, the productive forces that are at stake in the understanding and production—(ana)dialectically—of a certain conception/apprehension of the real, the political ontology that Dussel exposes on the Christianities of northern Europe (between 1630-1789). To carry out this analysis, a historical itinerary from Bodin to Locke was followed in which the process of shaping a modern poietics deepens qualitatively over time. A poietics that is based primarily on the emergence of technical productive forces (subject-object) susceptible to formalist fetishization over procreative productive forces (subject-subject) rooted in the material domains of community existence. Of all the authors examined by Dussel, it is possible to establish a space of *relative exteriority* within the prism exposed on Western political sovereignty, from the referential negation of Bodin and Hobbes to its economic naturalization (around money as a universal equivalent) in Locke. This space is embodied by Spinoza's thought.

Although for Spinoza the basal nexus between conatus and market is conceived, likewise, as Castro-Gómez (2019) puts it, it is possible to find next to the passionate antagonism of the horizon of human survival a potential to “*compose forces* with others, in order to become stronger” (p. 165). In other words, at the level of affect there is not only antagonism due to the struggle for the strongest, but also the possibility of political *cooperation and association* (as a poietic composition). In this way, *joining forces* (the vocation of the majority of politics) so that some individuals united with others can *strengthen* their survival capacity *together* is at the heart of republican politics. In Spinoza, there would also be a possibility of relative exteriority in the *potencia* adopted from the multitude or the people to *affectively* convey the civil order, especially for those places of global geopolitics in which the emancipatory devices of the republic, by way of the institutional normalization of equality and liberty—although it should be added the lack of reciprocity and economic solidarity—can still contribute much to the great precarious majorities of the planet; hence, not only a fetishistic poiesis but potentially an emancipatory poiesis as well.

Finally, from this we derive the importance, when observing the (poietic) production of the second early modernity in northern Europe genealogically, to retake the liberating and decolonizing project of transmodernity, situating it from diverse loci of enunciation and spaces of experiences so as not to fall into fetishistic dogmatisms and to carry out a praxis of critical realism effectively, as Dussel tries to capture in his history and critique of the politics of liberation.

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The Dialectic Between the Two Faces of Political Discourse in Mature Modernity

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Introduction

In 1992, Dussel shook the Eurocentric academic world by presenting eight lectures at the University of Frankfurt—these will later be published under the title *1492: El encubrimiento del Otro*. The thesis of this work was countercultural and novel since it exposed Modernity as a phenomenon with two faces:

It is about going towards the origin of the ‘myth of modernity.’ Modernity has a rational emancipatory ‘concept’ that we will affirm, that we will subsume. But at the same time, it develops an ‘irrational myth’ in the justification of violence, which we must deny and overcome. (Dussel, 1992, p. 11)

So, Dussel, in the nineties considered that modernity has on the one hand, an emancipatory side and, on the other hand, an irrational myth that justifies violence; the argumentative thread that supports this quality of myth is articulated with Eurocentrism whose *concomitant component* is the *developmentalist fallacy*.

Subsequently, in 2007 Dussel published *Política de la Liberación: Historia Mundial y Crítica*, where he expounds a counter narrative, understood as a narrative of an anti-traditional tradition. The purpose of the text is to deconstruct political philosophy and the history of politics. The philosopher of liberation affirms:

In general these stories, even the most affirmed and recent ones, continue within certain frames that limit them. Breaking these [seven] frames, although propaedeutically, is the primary, frontal purpose of this history (...) in order to compose a narrative from the vantage of another historical paradigm. (Dussel, 2007, p. 11)

In this order of ideas, it can be seen that there is an argumentative coherence in those mature works in which modernity is apprehended as a phenomenon composed of a duality, a phenomenon that must be overcome and, at the same time, one that cannot be denied because “Latin America has been (for better or for worse) a principal participant in the world history of modern politics” (Dussel, 2007, p. 12). For all that has been said above, the purpose of this paper is to understand how political discourse in mature modernity is conceptualized by politics of liberation to briefly glimpse both faces of modernity.

First face: the myth of modernity

To begin, this document will emphasize the counter-narrative of *mature modernity*; in the words of the philosopher of liberation: “we are facing a historical break of enormous importance in the structure of the world-system” (Dussel, 2007, p. 323). This is so insofar as Dussel argues that the industrial revolution produces an acceleration at the technical-instrumental level that brings with it consequences of a world hegemony (*civilizational deployment*) and a *distorting and Eurocentric* political philosophy (whose greatest expression is given in Hegel). The argumentative thread that supports

this thesis is the following: first, the industrial revolution will produce an acceleration at the instrumental technical level that enables the European civilizational unfolding that will leave behind China and Hindustan, thus establishing a world hegemony headed by Europe. Second, the Enlightenment produces a political philosophy that creates three representations that conceal and make invisible the world reality of the periphery of the world system for two centuries. Those three representations are: the center, westernism, and southern Europe.

Regarding the first argument, it would be worth stating that for philosophy of liberation the industrial revolution founds a new world geopolitical structure, since “the industrial revolution is, without a doubt, one of the events not only technological-economic, but also cultural, political and of enormous philosophical influence. In any case, its historical origin is slowly becoming clear in the last decade” (Dussel, 2007, p. 324). This quote brings up the question that asks why the origin of the Industrial Revolution is Great Britain.

Dussel returns to the approaches expressed in *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* by historian Kenneth Pomeranz (1958). Pomeranz performs a comparative analysis of the economic systems of China and Great Britain at the end of the 18th century to show that both were in a parallel evolution until the industrial revolution, this produced a bifurcation that would give superiority to the European world over China at a technological and economic level. Now, facing the question: why did the industrial revolution arise in such a specific place as England in the eighteenth century? For the historian, there are two pillars that allow the emergence in England: the extraction of coal and the exploitation of the colonies that helped solve the Malthusian trap. Thus, Dussel takes up Pomeranz's postulates to show that there is no superiority in scientific or ethical terms as proposed by Weber, it was not a new ethos that produced capitalism, but rather an ecological imbalance, because in China, the potential workers had to return to agricultural production, because the destructive use of the soils due to overexploitation and deforestation demanded more labor in the fields to produce food for the entire population. The resources coming from the American colonies enabled Great Britain to free its peasantry. For Pomeranz:

The “great slaughter” and repopulation with slave labor made the region around the Caribbean the “ideal” trading partner for a nascent industrial region. The bottom line, from Pomeranz's point of view, is not the size of the colonial market, but the fact that the New World and the slave trade offered something that no other market could offer: an area socially and politically “configured” to maintain a continuous exchange of capital goods—in this case, in the form of kidnapped people—and consumer manufactures, for increasing quantities of land-intensive goods—food, fiber, and later wood—at reasonable prices. (Ibañez, 2007, pp. 147-148)

Consequently, the colonies that England possessed were catalytic factors in its emergence as the first industrialized country. And, as will be seen shortly, the industrial revolution had an effect on the development of political philosophy as well.

Regarding the second direct argument, it should be mentioned that Dussel brings up Franz Hinkelammert, who, in *The subject and the law*, had put on the table the discussion of instrumental rationality and its result in the irrationality of the rationalized through a set of methodological comments on the instrumental rationality of Locke, Hume and Smith, since they develop and represent the process of legitimation of modernity in its identification with capitalism.

Dussel makes manifest the historical context of Calvinist Scotland, since the birth of modern political philosophy is intimately linked to the triumph of the bourgeoisie, and, not only mercantile but also industrial capitalism in Great Britain. For this reason, because it is the reference of the Scottish bourgeois existence and its process towards mercantilism, the philosophy of Hume and Locke has *property* as its central issue.

On the one hand, according to Hinkelammert, Hume defines means-end rationality as the rationality of the market and of private property, which gives rise to the ethics of the market that appears in Smith and Weber. Dussel, following Hinkelammert's interpretation, provides a close reading of *The Treatise on Human Nature* to comprehend the theoretical level of understanding and the principle of causality, and its articulation with the practical level of moral philosophy and the principle of justice in addition to a theory of passions, since Hume, to formulate a bourgeois ethic, uses a specific method to think about ethics, namely: *mental inference*. Hinkelammert states:

It is in fact a method that appears in all modern sciences (...), an impossible world is imagined in order to discover, in relation to it, *empiria*, like the world that, starting from the impossible world, is possible to discover as *empiria*. That is to say, empiricism consists of interpreting the world as a deviation from an imagined impossible world that is utopian. (Mora, 2004, p. 29)

It is because of this that Dussel and Hinkelammert agree that Hume's political economy uses the method of inference so that the issue of an ethics of the market is, ultimately, a political description of the institutions where a certain conception of subjectivity will have justice as a reference. This is understood as what makes industrial bourgeois society possible through an apology of property, hence the purpose of this method is to demonstrate how capitalism is the only or best possible society. After establishing the cognitive¹ and practical² order, the argument revolves around the foundation of institutions by means of three essential laws: the law of stability, of possession and transfer by consent, and the realization of promises. The security of society depends on these laws, which is presented in Hume as the principle of Justice that is closely related to private property. After exposing the architectural parallelism between theoretical and moral level of Hume's political economy, Dussel describes the fallacy present in the thought of the Scottish philosopher through Hinkelammert's *criteria of specification of institutions*. The fallacy consists of the following: from the impossibility of a world without property does not follow the need for capitalist-type property since it is not the only possible mode of property. Hence, Dussel and Hinkelammert agree that property is being fetishized and with it the organization of institutions.

¹ In Hume the cognitive aspect is the application of the principle of causality as an organizational criterion of ideas and objects that refer to the real world. Thus, it is not possible to know what does not enter into these relations of contiguity, similarity or causality. For this reason memory, the senses, the understanding, are based on the imagination, since the principle of causality understood as mental inference enables us to reason, and convince us of the continuous existence of external objects and their relationship to ideas.

² The method of inference lies in contemplating the impossibility of living in other possible worlds where there is no need for private property and, therefore, in which justice cannot be found. Hence, the argumentative thread revolves around the role of justice as necessary, because in the real world as a totality of experience, multiple passions of individuals are related that tend to destroy themselves, in the words of Hume (as cited in Dussel, 2007) "...because each one wants the few existing goods for himself, to the exclusion of the others, that is why endless conflicts occur." (p. 333). For this reason, justice must guarantee the conditions of private property.

The influence of Hume and Locke can be traced in Smith since it is postulated that the market is the social sphere that ensures the general interest of society. Through the institution of the market, under the limited exercise of the power of the State, the harmonic movement of the system can be achieved which, according to Smith (as cited in Dussel, 2007), “manifests itself within the consciousness of an ‘impartial spectator’, and in the objective world of the market as an apparently chaotic order, but ‘ordered’ by the ‘invisible hand of God’ (p. 336). In research on the nature and cause of the wealth of nations, Smith has an optimistic position before the effects of the Industrial Revolution, this is seen as a civilizing and ethical process of universal harmony led by the invisible hand of providence. Sympathy is the feeling that unites one and the other in society, for this reason, it is the foundation of harmony in society, the principle of moral order. Smith adds that man is an immediate judge of humanity in the first instance, since everything is appealed by a higher court, this is the impartial and well-informed spectator who possesses general rules and a high sense of duty. It is a derivation of the existence of social institutions whose condition of possibility lies in the impartial observer who makes the discovery of such rules possible and, furthermore, maintains harmony in society. For this reason, the principle of the practical moral order is passed to the economic order. In Smith’s words:

So if the feeling of sympathy permitted one to ethically place oneself in the place of the other; likewise, the impartial spectator mediated between the “actor and the patient”, in the same way now the principle of exchange or the market allows giving the other what he needs to be able to obtain that the producer, that is, what he needs for his part: “give me what I want and you will have what you want.” (in Dussel 2007, p. 340)

Consequently, the general rules of ethics are transformed into market norms typical of the capitalist economy, subsuming sympathy and the principle of the impartial observer. In addition, the economy becomes independent from politics to the extent that the political must leave the harmonic logic of the market in total autonomy; the state “should not get involved where the invisible hand has its kingdom” (Smith in Dussel, p. 342). Therefore, the state is at the service of the bourgeoisie. Dussel states that this is the classical conception of the modern European bourgeois State, which, from the beginning of mature modernity, will continue in force until the 21st century. It would be worth asking: in mature modernity, was there only the possibility of a modern State or on the contrary, was the construction of the liberal bourgeois state product of a victory against different political ideologies?

The ultimate expression of the Eurocentric myth of modern politics falls on Hegel’s political thought, for this reason, Dussel affirms that a historical reconstruction of his political philosophy is crucial. It is due to the Industrial Revolution that Europe, for the first time, experiences being the center of world history, and, according to Dussel, Hegel captured that recent experience of European supremacy. For philosophy of liberation, Hegel manifests the dominating totality of the modern State since the starting point is *being-in-itself*, this is equivalent to the *free will* that is linked to an original and founding ontological horizon of the modern political totality that configures European subjectivity, since the possession of something is equivalent to the modern European *will* that is imprinted on that thing. That indeterminate subjectivity only develops concretely when it possesses something (private property) and that will be protected by the objectivity of the law, it is the bourgeois ethos. In this sense, Dussel mentions that:

Like civil or bourgeois society, the liberal state is only external and cannot overcome its contradictions, and for this reason there is an unresolved and opposed plurality of different

ethos, of the classes in conflict. It is a divided, “atomistic” state. (...) The liberal State or civil society (bourgeois) stops halfway: it defends individual rights and their freedoms within a certain abstract universality. This equivocation requires, as a necessary logic and inevitable result, that it be a police state, which has power as external control and domination, not as the internal conviction of its unique members. (Dussel, 2007, p. 385)

Second face: Are there liberating elements within the political philosophy of mature modernity?

If modernity only had the face of the irrational myth of violence there would be nothing within modern political thought that could be subsumed in favor of the transformation and liberation of the evil, hegemonic world order. Furthermore, if the second face of modernity is unknown, Dussel would be anti-modern. But, he is transmodern since he recognizes how the phenomenon of colonization is not reducible to genocide or westernization, but rather understands that it is the establishment of a cultural hegemony that transformed the world of life through the process of political-cultural modernization. What are the implications of this transmodern vision? Dussel is going to take the categories and modern postulates, subsuming them and transforming them into theoretical tools from the Politics of Liberation—for example: some postulates in the thought of Rousseau, Kant and Marx.

On the one hand, Dussel highlights that Rousseau was an implacable critic of modernity and, therefore, opens the way through which the Politics of Liberation will pass. Rousseau goes against the idea of progress and reason as a distinctive and superior feature of European culture, which exalts itself above all traditional values, eliminating the popular customs of savage man (the predecessor of the formations of civilization). To review the critical contributions that Rousseau made in his time, Dussel envisions two main texts: the first is *The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Between Men and Whether it is Authorized by Natural Law* and the second is the best-known work *On the Social Contract or Principles of Political Law*. From the first text Dussel highlights the following: First, Rousseau, unlike his contemporaries, not only contemplates poverty as a starting point, but also, treats inequality in moral or political terms as an effect of historical processes and not as moments of the state of nature.³ This countercultural thesis goes against Smith, Locke and Hobbes, since that generation defines inequality as a matter of natural fact leaving aside the historical configuration. For this reason, they could not understand that “inequality consists of different privileges that some use to the detriment of others, such as being rich, more honest, more powerful than others, or even being obeyed” (Rousseau in Dussel 2007, p. 347). This is the reason why the axis of Rousseau’s political philosophy is not property, the division of labor, or an ethic of the market like his predecessors. He is critical of capitalism.

Second, Rousseau’s conception accounts for a countercurrent political philosophy insofar as it does not agree with the way of conceiving freedom as liberalism had postulated it. It is worth mentioning

³ The starting point of the English philosophers lay in the conception of a state of nature where oppression and passions are manifest, therefore, anthropological understanding described the human being as a being whose purpose is always to attack, fight and dominate (Hobbes). Rousseau’s counterargument revolves around the moral simplicity that the wild man possesses, insofar as he tends to conservation, then he uses goods to cover basic needs, in this way, habits, customs, language, a sedentary lifestyle, and institutions are developed. There is no injustice before the appearance of property, for only when the concept and experience of property is developed can one speak of interested love. Therefore, all evils are the effect of property and bring inequality with them.

Castro-Gómez (2018) suggestion that a rereading of the history of modern political philosophy should be made following in the footsteps of Quentin Skinner. The Colombian philosopher states that in the period of the Enlightenment there was a concept of freedom that has little to do with liberalism, "...so it is that while for liberalism the principle of freedom prevails over that of equality, for republicanism, equality is seen as a condition of freedom" (Castro, 2018, p. 166). If so, that is why, in the myth of modernity—and the thinkers seen above—a concept of negative freedom is handled, since it is postulated from liberalism, while the other face of modernity reflects a concept of positive freedom associated with material conditions necessary to truly be free. Therefore, it is this rescuing of the material sphere is what Dussel highlights in modern thinkers like Rousseau and Marx.

Rousseau defends the idea of natural freedom that has been sacrificed in the name of the law of property and inequality. As Dussel puts it: "our critic then inverts the argument of the classics of liberalism" (p. 349). The foregoing is interpreted this way because for Rousseau what grounds institutions is no longer the right to conquest and with it the State of war, nor the right to property, but rather he bases the foundations of institutions in a freedom conceived from the social contract as that which fights inequality. In *The Social Contract*, the general will is situated at a discursive, practical intelligence level closely related to the body politic (the people), insofar as it is a consensus that has been institutionalized. But it leaves aside the fact that the general will must also refer to the material level (the content of the political motivation of the people), and in turn the historical character of the political community. Consequently, the general will becomes "always constant, unalterable and pure" (p. 352). For Dussel, this is relevant to the extent that it is not enough only to conceive the community as power in-itself, but it is necessary to differentiate power, since this differentiation will allow us to understand the relationship between will and power, and delegation of power for the establishment of institutionality. Unfortunately, the French philosopher falls into what he had criticized in his contemporaries. He emphasizes natural facts leaving aside historical effects and what will later be called by the politics of liberation *the fetishization of power*. Nevertheless, the politics of liberation emphasizes that the general will is a concrete instrument of the exercise of consensuality for the establishment of the political.

Additionally, Dussel highlights the material content that political philosophy must contain. Therefore, having examined the formal aspect of the consensus represented by Rousseau, it is necessary to look back at Kant, Fichte and Marx, since they will contradict the postulates that reach their maximum expression in Hegel. Fichte, contrary to the English philosophers and Kant, develops a critique of mercantilism and the free trade of the market, for this reason he affirms that property is not the condition of citizenship, but rather that citizenship is the condition of property. In turn, Fichte states that the economic material order is not outside the political field but is determined by the legal structure and the coercion of the State. Therefore, the market is not, as for Smith, an indifferent world environment, but is determined within the horizon of the State.

Kant's political philosophy has a moral basis since politics deals with the realization of the practical moral subject so that the conditions for an ethical, historical progress are created. The State works under the principle of freedom and the promotion of happiness so that *perpetual peace*⁴ can be carried

⁴ The formal sense of the validity of Kantian morality emphasizes creating a world in which morality is assured and guaranteed, therefore the state of war must be avoided and the state of peace created. Thus, the duty of virtue is also found in politics, since the struggle to establish peace is a material requirement of achieving the highest good. The

out and with it the fulfillment of morality. Given what has been said above, politics is developed at a formal level as a doctrine of law and cannot cover the material aspect since it does not promote a critical conscience around the commercial political economy. Nevertheless, Kant develops the principle of finality that has to do with the concept of freedom and develops the historical teleological causality *par excellence*. Despite the fact that Kant does not think about politics in deeper material conditions, Dussel preserves the application of Kant's principle that the constitution of a good action requires a content, an end, since what is acted upon is a concrete end according to the beginning of finality, that is to say, without end there is no action.

Last but not least is the thought of Marx, who carries out a political deconstruction of the State beginning from the unjust division of labor within capitalism. Marx launches a material-economic critique of politics.⁵ To this point:

The material dimension of politics (human life that takes into account the conditions necessary for its production, reproduction and public, community, ecological, economic, cultural development) should not be discarded as extra-political "social"; Nor should it be considered the last political instance, devaluing the "political field" by making the economy the only relevant and ultimate field of human reality. The solution is to articulate the material economic and social with the formal democratic, with the institutional feasibility of the State, and with the other moments of the architecture of "the political" (...) The political problem now does not lie in reformulating the abstract political state, but in the transformation of structures at the material level of bourgeois society (Dussel, 2007, pp. 395-397).

With this quote, we conclude in full awareness that we participate in the discourse of the politics of mature modernity. For this reason, the project of transmodernity must apprehend the two faces of modernity as indicated by Dussel. The richness of this rigorous review of modern political discourse elaborated by the philosopher of liberation allows us to glimpse the role of the transformation of modern structures that do not attend to the material level, since these were designed only from the formality of bourgeois law, one that only guarantees the legality and security of private property. Nevertheless, the formal level plays a fundamental role in terms of the establishment of institutions by the people (*potentia* as it will be developed later in the Politics of Liberation), emphasizing consensus and the *will to live*. However, the articulation of conflict and consensus as constitutive axes of the political is left pending.

Although it is true that the myth of modernity works under the interpretative theoretical fabrication of history that takes place through European ideology, culture, and philosophy, this resulted in a political discourse whose epistemological and ontological horizon is totalized in a liberal State that, in turn, politically expands the capitalist economic system. For this reason, it exerts violence against the periphery and against those political discourses that, within mature modernity, took up the demands regarding the satisfaction of needs of the popular revolutions. Thus, in the bourgeois liberal State we see that "the substitution of equality on which the popular revolution is based, an

problem with the world of ends is that the will is presupposed, but not known empirically, since it is situated on a transcendental cognitive level, ignoring that morality can be fetishized.

⁵ Dussel describes how Marx starts from two undeniable facts, religion and politics, in that sense he builds the argument regarding the critique of theology that becomes a critique of politics. What is relevant is how the criticism of Christianity from a material perspective leads one to contemplate the secularization of politics. However, Marx realized that even when the Christian state is secularized, the human being will not be fully emancipated, therefore, it is necessary to overcome the contradictions that are not resolved by Hegel's State.

equality among human beings who mutually recognize each other as beings with needs, an equality in the name of the satisfaction of needs and possibilities of life” (Hinkelammert in Mora, 2004, p. 22). This substitution takes place in order to postulate equality only before the law. The egalitarian ethos that accompanies the concept of non-liberal positive freedom is undoubtedly a liberating element that the Politics of Liberation knows how to subsume.

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In the Dependency of 'Mature Modernity:' Some Themes for a History of Politics in Latin America

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In the Dependency of 'Mature Modernity:' Some Themes for a History of Politics in Latin America

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At this point in the work, Enrique Dussel relates the texts and contexts of what he calls a history of Latin American philosophical thought in general, and of regional political philosophical thought in particular, in view of a political philosophy of Latin American liberation. The objective is:

Being able to "locate" the starting point of the constructive discourse to develop the political architectonics, written to think about the most pressing problems that concern us as Latin Americans (although it has a claim to globality, valid equally for Asia or Africa), and in which an architectonics of the Politics of Liberation would consist. (Dussel, 2007, pp. 402)

The section begins by showing three theoretical-historical moments where the ambiguity that arises from reflecting on Latin American politics and political philosophy becomes an argumentative strength that accentuates the undeniable connection between these two dimensions.

In the first place, the moment of the critique of the conquest was for Dussel (2007), "the beginning of the 'anti-discourse' of Modernity, as such, and therefore, the first chapter of a political philosophy of liberation at the beginning of world globalization" (p. 401). Once again, the colonial Modernity, which began in 1492, and which differentiates Latin America from European Modernity, will be the starting point of a politics of Latin American liberation.

The second moment is situated in 1808, when the arrest of King Ferdinand VII allowed and legitimized the formation of Government Boards in the most important American cities. Here arises the justification for Latin American Independence and the creation of Latin American States in the post-colonial era. This period is what Dussel takes as the first Emancipation.

The third moment began in 1959 with the Cuban Revolution, followed in 1979 with the Sandinista Revolution and in 1994 with the uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation. Although these emancipatory attempts could have been a second emancipation, what they actually mark is the continuity of a certain Eurocentrism with its attending ideological and political systems of oppression. This fact is precisely what prompts us to continue maturing, especially from the peripheries, "an awareness of the need to deny the increasingly overwhelming (and in a certain way more dominant) structures of postcolonial metropolises" (p. 402). According to Dussel (2007,) this moment "is situated as a theoretical expression that tries to justify this second Emancipation or the ongoing liberation of *our continent* (and of the entire peripheral postcolonial world)" (p. 402).

Some Antecedents of the First Latin American Emancipation

The unfinished crisis of Emancipation (the first, from the beginning of the 19th century), like a deep wound, has not healed, and in a certain way still predetermines the required second Emancipation (to be carried out, it is to be hoped, in this 21st century).

-Dussel, Enrique, 2007.

As Dussel developed in the previous chapter, in the capitalist phase of liberalism, Latin America was left "on the fringes of history" (Zea, 1957, p. 174). At the very moment in which China, Hindustan

and the Ottoman Empire were excluded from “modern civilization,” Europe positions itself as a world center and from there configures what for several centuries will be considered the periphery. The capitalist Industrial Revolution, due to structural and fortuitous causes, tipped the balance towards some regions, such as Great Britain and France. Turning to Wallerstein (1979), Dussel reminds us that in this Latin American historical moment, the extraction of wealth was structural and gigantic in proportion to what was produced:

Gold and silver were largely brought to the Peninsula and the king required strict accounting. The “literate city”—fortress of the presence of the white (Spanish or Creole), of the baroque culture, which had dozens of university teaching centers for its elites, and ecclesiastical, economic, or military professionals—was dispersed in a rural, indigenous continent. (Dussel, 2007, pp. 405)

The processes of domination, concealed in civilizing political intentions, have forged both theoretical production and emancipatory practices since the beginning of the 19th century. During this period, the place of education becomes relevant. It is about thinking about a different education, which forges subjects (and only subjects since the education of women has always been a field of struggle in different countries and regions) capable of thinking beyond the imposed Spanish domination. In our case:

In Latin America there were other interests than in France, because in France the new education was precisely trying to create subjects suitable for industrial capitalism, while in Latin America, they will be subjects capable of emancipating themselves from Spain. (Dussel, 2007, pp. 408)

In this way, thinking from one's own context implies resignifying the germ provided by the colonial political thought that breaks out in “mature Modernity.” Some of the antecedents that Dussel takes in his journey of this emancipatory political philosophy are Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora (historian and professor of mathematics at the Mexican Academy, 1645-1700), Rafael Campoy (Jesuit mentor of Clavijero) and Clavijero himself. Through their voices and reflections, the Other Histories that Europe simply denied, misrepresented, and even ridiculed in its falsely scientific, although ideologically consistent, analysis begin to pass into the plane of consciousness. We begin to glimpse what had been denied:

In the 18th century, nationality began to be experienced in a different way. In this way the origins of a history hidden by the European conquerors are discovered. Now an attempt is being made to reconstruct the memory of the cultures prior to the Spanish invasion. It is about the history of the Mexicans, the history of the Incas. The affirmation of Difference arises. The first criticism of Eurocentrism then occurs. (Dussel, 2007, pp. 408)

Dussel dedicates a large part of this chapter to the legacy of the Jesuit Francisco Xavier Clavijero (1731-1787), who in 1770 wrote *La historia antigua de México* (1945). From his exile in Italy, Clavijero, in what for Dussel is a clear attitude against Eurocentrism, questions the supposed European-German truths regarding the constitution of the American being. He becomes aware that his world is said from an outside that does not represent him and, between irony and lucidity, expresses beginnings that try to forge new generations that are not Eurocentred, not deluded:

By confronting what is said in a “scientific” tone about “his world”, he cannot help but rebel against the “Eurocentric” attitude that surrounds him. If the European is somewhat stronger than some indigenous people, it is so in the same way “as the Swiss are stronger than the Italians and yet we do not believe that the Italians have degenerated, nor do we accuse the Italian climate of this.”¹ (Dussel, 2007, pp. 410)

As if this were not enough, in the year in which the king prohibited the use of another language except Spanish in Mexico, Clavijero, “against this measure, will translate prayers in thirteen indigenous languages and write a Nahuatl grammar” (Dussel, 2007, p. 409). Rebel and lucid, Clavijero is one of the first to affirm that Amerindian culture is comparable to the great classical cultures of humanity (such as Egyptian, Greek or Roman), that there is no support, much less scientific, of any such racial inferiority, and thus, that indigenous cultural value, was on equal footing as those cultures that Europeans accepted as their origins (Dussel, 2007, p. 409).

It should be noted that the American territory in the middle of the 16th century was organized into viceroyalties in which frequently “an archbishop had more authority before the people than the viceroy himself” (Clavijero, 1945, p. 259). As Dussel puts it:

The popular imaginary gave ultimate authority to their religious rites and beliefs—pre and post-conquest—(...) Even in economic matters or matters regarding the boundaries between communities, ecclesial entities were often more important than civil policies themselves, since the parishes (of each bishopric) reached with their daily presence even the most secluded town or hamlet of indigenous or peasant farmers. (Dussel, 2007, p. 404-405)

The Jesuit missions, history has shown, through innumerable narratives, were among the most respectful of the important legacy already visible to those who lived with and in the communities of native peoples throughout the continent. Dussel highlights the importance of religious influence in the beginnings of Latin American emancipatory thought, the same one that liberals and the various lefts tried to quickly secularize “(...), ignoring the millennial burden of the popular imagination, within which *one must know how to learn rather than try to use*”.

The revolutionary will born in these times results in the emergence of “Hispanic American political theories, which will have a regional and not purely Eurocentric physiognomy” (Dussel, 2007, p. 406) that will justify the armed struggle for Independence. This last point is the blow that requires beginning to theoretically base, from the fervor of the nascent and independent states, “political-strategic theories without posterior theoretical claims as such” (p. 412).

Law, religion and education will become the fields through which to found—on the march quite literally—the emancipatory armed struggles. Such is the case of Fray Servando de Mier in Mexico, who by “pushing back the appearance of the Virgin of Guadalupe by ten centuries, without denying the miraculous tradition, withdrew the benefit to the Spanish. In this way, he undermined the main—if not the only—legal basis of the conquest: the evangelizing mission” (Luqui Lagleyze, J. M., 2009, 144). He was accused by the Spanish of attempting to take away the glory of having brought the Gospel to New Spain and of ruining the rights of the King of Spain in the Americas based on the preaching of the Gospel. To which he refutes: “as if the Gospel of peace and freedom could be title of domain” (Luqui Lagleyze, 2009, 156).

¹ *Historia antigua de México, IV: Constitución física de los Mexicanos* (Clavijero, 1945, 259)

Other antecedents, perhaps better known, are, for example, Mariano Moreno in El Plata, Juan Germán Roscio or Simón Bolívar in Gran Colombia, who, even being educated within the norms of Hispanic American thought, all threw themselves into the task of justifying the right to rebellion against Spanish and Portuguese despotism (Dussel, 2007, p. 412).

The People, the Great Absentee of the New Postcolonial States

As we have seen, there is a connection not only in the architectonics, but also in the chronology of Dussel's work, which directly connects cultural and educational processes with the political. It is interesting to see how the theoretical and political background that Dussel chooses as references for this first emancipation do not escape that logic.

In this sense, Dussel draws attention to the Mexican Lucas Alamán, who at the end of the 18th century (1792), in addition to his important contributions to industry and economics, and the founding of a school of agriculture in Celaya and another of commerce in Mexico in 1820, generates a more than advanced precedent. He proposed in 1849 to found bilingual schools for indigenous people, and "since he was a deputy in the courts he had defended that indigenous people be educated in their languages" (Dussel, 2007, 426).

Forging new cultural projects, with non-colonized educational projects, brought with it the issue of political representation, historically denied to popular sectors and native peoples, not to mention women,² who, even in the so-called mature modernity, in Latin America, continued to make of education or political participation a right to be conquered.

This point remains unquestioned by Alberdi (1810) and Sarmiento (1811)—the last-mentioned representatives of the so-called "liberal" tradition in Latin America. The oppressed and excluded people "will be absent from the history of this century, or they will be denigrated as the 'barbarian', fruit of the disastrous period of Hispanic colonialism (at least in the 'traditional' liberal-conservative interpretation)" (Dussel, 2007, p. 425).

Both in the economic-constitutional emphasis of the politics of J.B. Alberdi, and in the political-cultural imprint left by D.F. Sarmiento we see the bases that explain the title of the final section of this chapter of Dussel's *Politics*, that is, *New failure of the postcolonial State before imperialism (1870-1930)*. The first for believing "naively" that the progress of the metropolises (England, France or the United States) would imply economic advances for the already situated peripheries. The second, for "expressing the civilization-barbarism dualism with a clarity that suggests either an immense naivety or an immeasurable cynicism" (p. 430). In Alberdi's case, Dussel points out, the naivety borders on paroxysm:

Everything in the civilization of our soil is European; America itself is a European discovery [...] Today, under independence, the indigenous do not figure or make up the world in our political and civil society [...] In America, everything that is not European is barbaric: there is

² "Since woman is the primary reason for sin, the weapon of the devil, the cause of the expulsion of man from paradise and the destruction of the old law, and since consequently all trade with her must be avoided, we defend and we expressly forbid that anyone is allowed to introduce a woman, whoever she is, even if she is the most honest, in this university." (Decreto de la Universidad de Bologna, 1377, as quoted in Palermo, 2006)

no more division than this: 1) the indigenous, that is, the savage, 2) the European, that is, we who were born in America and speak Spanish. (Dussel, 2007, pp. 430)

The *pueblo* was rather a concept to be constituted from the “best” of the current population in that territory and with the new immigrants from northern Europe. Thinking in this way enabled the so-called “conquest of the desert”³ (because it was a genocide and because it was not a desert territory, i.e. and not an inhabited land).

Finally, I would like to close this section with a point that resulted in a political-philosophical interpellation, seeing the nexus that Dussel establishes between the processes of liberation and philosophy. When mentioning the example of the Colombian Ambrosio López, a tailor who in 1847 organized the “Sociedad de Artesanos” in Bogotá, which promoted the fight against the importation of foreign merchandise, Dussel (2007) tells us: “These artisans were attempting an industrial proto-revolution and fought against imports; they never came to power, they never had a philosophy articulated in their interests. In the end they failed” (p. 426).

We could return to Villoro here, when in his speech *Philosophy and domination* (1978) he asks: “Why philosophy?” The why of philosophy is not separated from the idea of transformation and rupture in the face of the tendency to the continuity of the same: “authentic philosophical activity, which is not limited to reiterating established thoughts, cannot but be exercised in freedom of all subjection to the beliefs accepted by the community: it is liberatory thought” (Villoro, 2013). Precisely, Dussel tries to make explicit in his theoretical journey moments of continuities and breaks, where philosophical, cultural-educational, religious reflection, of law, among others, are a founding part of the liberatory praxis of a certain community. This will undoubtedly allow us to broaden our understanding of the current political-ideological situation in our territories.

Latin American Populisms (1910-1959)

In a novel analysis that goes from text to context, Dussel combines elements of linguistics, psychoanalysis and the social sciences to analyze Latin American populisms.⁴ The phenomenon called “populism” is defined as the appearance of a historical bloc in power, hegemonized by the bourgeoisie of the peripheral countries, in apparent alliance with the emerging working class. For Dussel, populism marks:

a transition from a liberal-traditional society to one of development of a new historical situation (at the ideological-cultural as well as the economic-political level), [and] requires an active symbolic function that allows the transition from a mythical peasant or marginal world to the rationality of the modern society (be it capitalist or socialist). (Dussel, 2007, pp. 439)

From linguistics, Dussel adopts method of Vladimir Propp (Propp, 2013), which consists of discovering the structure of the Russian fantasy tale “according to the functions of the characters” to analyze Latin American populist discourses.

³ The phrase refers to a military process headed in Argentina by Rosas in 1833, and by Roca in 1879.

⁴ It is worth making a clarification here. Although Dussel's analysis of Latin American populisms is, as always, meticulous, here we will make a brief outline that gives an idea of his approach to the subject. A deeper understanding will require the necessary reading of the text itself.

The populist political discourse includes a dramatization that, as a structural moment, has a central problem, an outcome, the formulation of enemies and helpers, who at the moment of meeting with the leader live a true popular party. It is at that moment that “the people leave the place of negativity, impotence, need: the profane, quotidian. The house, the neighborhood, the factory, the field. On the contrary, the manifestation is the place, the sacred space of positivity, fullness” (Dussel, 2007, p. 442). In this way, the word of the leader before the multitude in political discourse is a privileged moment in the exercise of populist political power.

From a more Freudian analysis, it is the figure of the hero-donor who has the conscience and obligation to fertilize history, to promote the donation of the desired “object” to his people, the recipient; his paternal attitude is always present (Dussel, 2007, p. 441). It is through fidelity, loyalty and faith in the leader that the desired “object” is achieved (concrete: work; utopian: social justice):

“Loyalty Day”, faith in the leader, confidence in his action, support, solidarity, consensus. It is the very foundation of the authority of the Mediator, of the Father. His real authority is moral; it is neither despotic nor objective: it is symbolic (Dussel, 2007, pp. 442)

To analyze the economic and political “context,” Dussel turns to the social sciences and carries out a historical contextualization of the emergence of Latin American populisms. The phenomenon of populism is incomprehensible without correctly situating the world situation that makes it possible.

From 1914 to 1945, with the whole process centered on the crisis of 1929, a struggle developed for the reorganization of the power structure of the center, for its participation and hegemony, occurring in the same way as the separation of a good part of said center because of the Russian Revolution and subsequent socialist revolutions (which will be an important factor, but in the post-populist stage). (Dussel, 2007, pp. 448)

It is in this context of struggle between the powers of the center that the peripheral nations began to enter into negotiations with the various forces in opposition:

Geopolitically they could be lean on Germany against England, or on England against the United States, or on the United States against England, depending on the circumstances. Of course, once the war of hegemony ended and the world divided in Yalta in 1945 between the United States and Russia, the possibility of populism will diminish until it disappears almost definitively since 1960. (Dussel, 2007, pp. 448)

According to Dussel's analysis, the populist project failed at various points. The first failure refers to a misinterpretation of the situation and, instead of taking advantage of the historical moment to radicalize the revolution, it was believed that the domination of the center had definitively ended, and not that it was due to transitory causes. Within the conformation of populist states, the diversification of social classes in conflict did not prevent the populist state from being a peripheral capitalist state (Dussel, 2007, p. 453). That is, although the “class struggle” is no longer ignored as in liberalism or repressed as in later militarist neo-fascism, the populist state will never question private property, but since it cannot defend it directly before the masses, it makes a semantic detour: class struggle becomes about extending the greatest possible amount of property to the entire population (Dussel, 2007, p. 462).

The lack of control and domination of the productive means (technology, capital and raw materials) of the dominated classes deprived them of true political participation:

The workers and peasants unions constitute to a large extent the apparatus of the Government (together with the party), so the leader mobilizes them against his possible enemies, but structurally demobilizes them before the very project of national industrialization. The popular classes are mediators of a project but not its main agents. (Dussel, 2007, pp. 462)

At this point Dussel is very precise. Populism demands the outcast, the exploited worker, acceptance of the capitalist industrial project, and as a counterproposal it promises a minimum wage, social security, etc. What Dussel calls a reformist pact, is presented, ideologically, as a revolutionary achievement of the working class, when in reality it is a necessity of the same capitalist system that needs a greater market, in Keynesian doctrine, for its own products.

Finally, the section ends with a reflection on the place of the Philosophy of Liberation, in this or other conjunctural contexts, that can promote the liberation of the sector of the bloc of the oppressed. Thinking philosophy as liberation implies for Dussel to immerse oneself in the practices of the people, integrated and against the status quo:

The practice of liberation of the oppressed people, then, is the condition of possibility from which a liberating philosophical thought can depart. This requires a rigorous method (which we have called the analectic method in our work *Method for a philosophy of liberation*), which now needs important and new distinctions to mature its critical-interpretive capacity. (Dussel, 2007, pp. 464)

The philosophy of liberation would have made the text coincide with its revolutionary context. And it is in this sense that, for Dussel, the philosopher who takes charge of said historical continental liberation will be able to account for the present reality, just as the political thought at the beginning of the 19th century accounted for neocolonial national emancipation.

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Updating of World History and Criticism: Philosophy of Liberation and Decolonization...One More Step

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Updating of World History and Criticism: Philosophy of Liberation and Decolonization...One More Step

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The Origin of the Philosophy of Liberation

Dussel tells us that this world history and criticism of politics has to be understood as a counter-narrative to tell what is not said, beginning from “the suffering corporality of our *pueblos*.” We would say that it is more than that. In our interpretation it is also a phenomenology of the politics of liberation because he does not limit himself to analyzing philosophical arguments, but by going back to the emergence of the *homo* species, four million years ago, he begins to reflect on the very meaning of politics to discover that the essence of politics is the production, reproduction, and development of human life and that the history of politics is debated in the effort to establish a full life of human communities. Criticism is also inherent in politics as that which moves to transform and liberate the oppressed and excluded from full life. In this sense, from the small nomadic human communities of the Amazon jungle to the North American political system, they have at their base a will to live that is inherent to them, regardless of the interests, variables, and contradictions that may converge in each concrete case. From this perspective, political philosophies appear to us in all their clarity as efforts to illuminate with understanding the quest to organize political life in concrete. History goes on imprinting its specificity in each case, and there is much we can learn from the various experiences of humanity. However, Dussel also puts us in front of the historical moment of Modernity, when a vision was imposed worldwide that today continues to determine the political life of peoples departing from the justification of the unjustifiable as a politics of domination: the very inversion of politics. But the history of politics continues. It is the history of human life in community that is debated in the construction of an organization that makes everyone’s life feasible. The peoples are convinced of being able to achieve it and for this reason they continue to fight to build a world in which a full and dignified life is a reality.

We come to the end of this *Critical World History* to discover what Dussel sees as bringing critical political reflection up to date. In this sense, the entire journey that is made throughout this work only takes on its true dimension in the final section, with a philosophy that seeks the critical voice of the people. This culminates in political thought of the Zapatistas that emerged at the end of the 20th century with the awareness of inaugurating a new moment in the history of world politics.

Dussel places the origin of the Philosophy of Liberation in that Argentine decade between 1966 and 1976. Many things have happened since then, and the Philosophy of Liberation has received continuous attacks that have tried to question its coherence and political commitment, as well as to dismiss its relevance not only in the history of Latin American philosophy, but also worldwide. This essay tries to respond to these attacks and show how it is that thought, born in a political situation not without contradictions, may flourish due to its ability to articulate historical reality and a political commitment to the denied and excluded. Philosophy, when it is true philosophy, thinks about concrete reality. Therefore the critique of philosophy, Dussel tells us, must be done, not from thought, but from reality. In that sense, reality is the beginning and the end, the orientation and the course.

To understand the emergence of the Philosophy of Liberation, Dussel traces his analysis to the year 1880 when the conquest of the desert by Julio A. Roca was proposed in Argentina, which led to the seizure of lands of almost a million square kilometers from the native peoples and their necessary genocide. Like most of the countries that make up Our America, Argentina starts from a founding murder. It is a republic of Cain that is configured from a racial and cultural cleansing, which declares the territory as empty, that is, as pure nature or objectivity. For modernity, nature does not have an end in itself. It is therefore a conquest of the desert, where there is nothing. The original peoples are nothing compared to the being of white, modern, European and Western civilization.

From that experience was born the great Argentine agrarian bourgeoisie that is configured around the export of meat and cereals to the English empire. From Marx we know that the mode of production not only produces goods, but consumers (Dussel, p. 467). That is, it not only produces objects but also subjects, the subjectivity that will incarnate in the Argentinian will then be this agrarian bourgeois subject. We want to emphasize—in case this it was not clear enough—that this subjectivity is not only found in the bourgeois, but also in the proletarian, and not only on the right, but also on the left with its clear nuances. What this is about then is the ideal that operates in the configuration of national identity.

We can then understand the point that Dussel makes with respect to populism. In the political context of his time, both the petty-bourgeois nationalist approach (in the radical case) or the laborists (in Peronism) were always circumscribed within the capitalist project, without questioning its fundamental principles. For this reason, they ultimately “succumbed to the ruling class properly articulated with capitalism and the world market” (p. 466).

The export bonanza that allowed the abundant inflow of dollars and sterling pounds will not last beyond 1930, when Argentina enters a full crisis owing to the overvaluation of the Argentine peso, which “reduced the income of the agricultural sector and subsidized the industrial sector and popular consumption (radical politics and Peronism). But later, with the devaluation of the peso, the income of the export sector increases and national industrialization and popular consumption contracts” (p. 467).

The political forces that arose in favor of the industrialization of the country and the consolidation of the internal market will put a great deal of tension in the bid for power. However, they will not be able to subtract from the great agrarian bourgeoisie that was managed at the convenience of English imperialism, which later will move to the background with the triumph of the USA and the expansion of transnational capitalism. In this context are framed the debates of positivism, antipositivism, Alberdi, liberalism, Krausism, Korn, Alberini and Francisco Romero (who for Dussel is an expression of the vision of the great agrarian bourgeoisie).

The technological backwardness and the decrease in the export capacity, the collapse that the Argentine economy suffers due to the intervention of American financial capital, undermined the country's economy, cornering it for the acquisition of abundant loans, union restriction, and finally producing the split in the labor movement that will converge in the Cordobazo.

Dussel specifically places the emergence of the Philosophy of Liberation between 1969 and 1973, just after the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Paris '68.

It is important to contextualize Philosophy of Liberation in its support of Peronism and Dussel affirms that it effectively came together in a conjunctural moment that must be understood in its own context. For Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation has walked alongside Latin American movements that have precisely allowed him to have a more concrete reading of reality, saving it from falling into simplifications. This seems important to me because if we are congruent with the idea that philosophy thinks reality and for reality, then it cannot be exempt from having a clear political commitment in concrete circumstances. It is precisely in thinking about reality and assuming in that thought the political responsibility that implies placing oneself on the line for the those denied by history.

In this context, Ramón Grosfoguel's critique of the intellectual as a sniper at the time of criticism seems relevant to me. For Grosfoguel, the sniper makes moral criticism, not political criticism, because he is dedicated to criticizing everyone from a pedestal that claims purity, and does not have reality as a starting point. The sniper does not take into account where we are today, and how to move forward in the construction of the new world. The sniper does not support any social movement, because he does not find any pure, ideal critical movement. In their purity, this intellectual ends up being as reactionary as the right and far right because they are reconciled with the status quo. In its hyper-radicalism, apparently ultra-left, it does not take into account that to transform the world we have to do politics, and that means designing a strategy and organically inserting ourselves into movements with all their defects in order to promote criticism from within.

The praxis of the Peronist youth certainly inspires the philosophy of liberation, "but its meaning transcends it" (p. 475). In fact, when Peronism later attacks the students, philosophy of liberation once again situates itself in critique on the side of the *pueblo* and the working class, specifically. Dussel says:

For our critics, the subsequent exhaustion of Peronism would have meant the end of the philosophy of liberation, and if this were true, this philosophical trend would have disappeared a long time ago, which nevertheless has not stopped growing in countries, works and precisions. (p. 474)

Along the way it could be seen that the Philosophy of Liberation was not an ideological partisan apparatus, but a thought committed to the liberation struggles of the *pueblos*, not only of Latin America, but even global (p. 474).

In this regard, he mentions "*el pueblo* was always a reference and therefore its categorization was also a very important moment, against the attacks of populism, when the category of 'class' was the starting point for dogmatists" (p. 474). It seems of great relevance, because dogmatic Marxism specifically put the order of discourse before reality, and therefore contributed to the invisibility of real (concrete) reality.

Philosophy of Liberation originated in the II National Congress of Philosophy of Argentina (1971) and little by little it acquired Latin American proportions. It grew significantly in various meetings such as those in Toluca, Puebla, Chihuahua, Tegucigalpa, Colombia, and Bogotá. Within this framework, the Asociación de Filosofía y Liberación was set up with representation in almost all Latin American countries and with a North American section.

The Decolonial Turn from el Pueblo

The left and Latin American Marxism will basically move in a Eurocentric manner during the 20th century, instrumentalizing possible allies and interpreting reality from “the necessary laws of the economy” that it inherited from positivism. Little by little, on the path of revolutions, it will “discover the concrete, historical, oppressed and excluded people,” more specifically, thus the “Politics of liberation is connected to this evolution towards the encounter with the people” (p. 475).

Dussel makes a reconstruction of the main precursors of the Philosophy of Liberation (until 1959) from the point of view of the advancement of the political criticism of the popular struggle. In this journey, he recognizes the different contributions of the political processes of Latin America:

- a) The Cuban Revolution: A process that had a greater understanding of the popular, beyond the standard Marxist view that interpreted the class category dogmatically and lost the opportunity to understand the Latin American reality and the political meaning of popular struggles in all its complexity.
- b) Sandinismo: It implied a huge advance in understanding of popular politics with respect to popular culture and its religiosity, which were interpreted positively.
- c) Zapatismo: This same interpretation was deepened, but now from the conception of the ancestral indigenous cultures of the continent.
- d) Governments with popular support and popular movements: They stand out as reaction processes against neoliberalism, and among them are the Bolivarian revolution, Kirchner, Tabaré Vázquez, Lula, and indigenous political movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, the latter led by Evo Morales.
- e) World Social Forum of Porto Alegre: The global articulation of thousands of new social movements.

Dussel sums it up by saying: “All this constitutes, together with other types of traditions, the historical marrow of radical, political-cultural thought in our continent” (p. 476).

Finally, Dussel will highlight some of the main contributions to the formulation of the decolonial project with which the Politics of Liberation culminates.

- a) Juan B. Justo interpreted that the “independence,” or first emancipation, was carried out under the leadership of the Creole oligarchy that instrumentalized the people, whereas the second emancipation should be led by the people.
- b) José Martí (1853-1895), who lived between the end of the independence wars against Spain and the beginning of the confrontation against the American empire, spoke of the need to carry out the second independence. And although he was not aware of what capitalism meant, he realized that a new type of cultural and civilizing colonialism was coming, in front of which he put Our America.
- c) Mariátegui (1894-1930), on the contrary, had a great understanding of capitalism, and carried out a situated reading of Marx’s work, not as mere application of the categories, but as a construction of the necessary categories based on concrete reality. He recognized the struggles of indigenous communities as a political, cultural, religious, ethnic and also economic struggle.
- d) Cuban Revolution: First socialist revolution on the continent. Fidel and Che were politicians invested by the people’s struggle, having risen up to their ethical expectations. Che used to

say: “The people are very interested in knowing if we are going to make this revolution or if we are going to make the same mistakes that the previous revolution made” (p. 476). And he understood that the revolution depended on producing objective changes, but above all to carry out a transformation of subjectivity, to create and embody what he called the new man, and that we would call the new *human being*: “What we really are, in truth, is colonial, semi-colonial or dependent countries. (...) The subjective conditions of which the most important is the awareness of the possibility of victory were lacking in America” (p. 493). Now we would say, what was really needed and is still needed today is a decolonizing revolution.

- e) Allende knew that a new gap was opening in history, his socialist government had come to power by electoral means.
- f) In the midst of despair, in the face of the expansion of military dictatorships, the Sandinista Revolution made its way with a renewed spirit, embracing a militant cultural and religious pluralism that “touched the popular imagination like no other revolution” (p. 477). Between Christianity and revolution there is no contradiction, the people shouted. This attitude left behind the Marxist-Leninist dogmatism of real socialism and “opened the possibility of articulation with the complex, historical, concrete, plural people and with social movements (p. 477).
- g) The Zapatista revolution erupts shortly after the commemoration of the 500 years of the conquest of the continent. Dussel is inspired in a very important way by the Zapatistas. The blood that circulates in Dussel's *Politics of Liberation*. The very content of “power” is precisely the command to obey the people, which will later resound in the Bolivian process of change and the construction of the plurinational state.

Final words

Dussel's text was published in 2007. The process of change in Bolivia was just beginning. I believe that the novelties and contradictions of this process would have led to even more critical reflections to conclude this critical world history and to establish more clearly the place of enunciation of criticism.

Bolivia is a country with a majority population of indigenous peoples, and initially the construction of a plurinational and communitarian state was proposed. This meant carrying out a true decolonizing revolution. It was not fully accomplished and the process dangerously risked failure. Many things have happened since then, and today the people return to the charge, with more experience and with more radicalism, because what they are attempting, no longer to think the world from Bolivia, but think the world from life. It is a paradigm shift that political thought has not yet sufficiently problematized. We need to give one more twist to the screw of criticism.

Modernity set out to dominate nature in order to humanize it; paradoxically, the result was the opposite. The domination of nature brutalized the human being, today native peoples call us to carry out the reverse process. Nature is not a thing, it is not even in front of us. She is a mother and hugs us, her voice is in us and we are also her because we come from her, but we have not become aware of what that means. The human being must rise to the level of life and learn to speak its word, which is our deepest essence.

Marx affirmed that one had to be radical and that this root was in the human being. While the root is in the human being, life is the miracle that makes it grow.

...And it's fulfilled my beloved, you are my sky and I am your earth. Welcome.

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Afterword to the Special Issue: Reflections on the World History of the Politics of Liberation

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Afterword to the Special Issue: Reflections on the World History of the Politics of Liberation

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This remarkable special issue, which presents the collective work of the Asociación de Filosofía y Liberación and a selection of its investigations of the work of the great philosopher Enrique Dussel, is an indispensable intervention across a range of philosophical fields. In particular, the articles collected here, made available by the crucial editorship and careful translations of educational scholar Adam Martinez in coordination with AFyL, challenge the narrow disciplinarity and profound Eurocentrism of academic political theory. They bring the news of a collective rethinking of global history and knowledge that concerns us all, as intellectuals and educators, and presented here in the *Texas Education Review* they implicitly challenge (and invite) U.S.-based scholars to a scholarly conversation beyond the sanctioned bounds of what de Sousa Santos calls the West's "abyssal thinking."

In the first place, this special issue is an invitation to intellectuals and educators to take up serious study of the work of Enrique Dussel. While the university, especially in the Global North, obsessively rehearses tired skirmishes between standard bearers of the canon and critics who refuse its bloated universalisms and "grand narratives," Dussel has put forward a philosophical project on an extraordinary scale, which systematically critiques modern philosophy and which nevertheless in its expansiveness and vigor refuses the postmodern tendency to anomie and abstentionism. Sweeping past the fragmentation and bad faith of the university's bland disciplinary divisions and sterile professionalism, Dussel's work persistently investigates the central theoretical and practical problem of the epoch: the problem of liberation in a world organized on the basis of domination. Dussel, the philosopher of liberation, confronts the Western philosophical tradition with thinking and knowledge from those regions and peoples that it has tried to refuse and erase, while at the same time rescuing it from its own impasses in extending the Western tradition's authentic accomplishments beyond the limits it is incapable of cognizing. Above all, Dussel's work, in historical and conceptual terms, locates Abya Yala at the inauguration of modernity, not merely as victim but as central agent and author—not of colonial violence but rather of the persistent fact and possibility of ethics, solidarity, and non-dominative knowledge. In this regard, Dussel's work is not just a crucial addition to global philosophy; rather, it is *indispensable*—we simply cannot do without his insights if we want to participate in intellectual work that seeks to advance the thriving of human and non-human beings in the contemporary world.

Within this broad context, the articles in this special issue powerfully trace the key stages of Dussel's *Política de la liberación*. Outlined in these systematic accounts of Dussel's argument is, in pedagogical terms, the essential trajectory for a collective *unlearning* of domination. First, against the ostensible autonomy and world-historical primacy that Europe has imagined as its unique civilizational attributes, these essays describe Dussel's catalogue of 1) the foundational achievements of non-European civilizations long before the supposedly originary cultural moment of Ancient Greece and Rome, and 2) the crucial economic and cultural *dependence* of European development on precisely those societies and peoples it constructed as "marginal." Second, and perhaps even more importantly—at least for students of philosophy—these articles unfold Dussel's analysis of Western philosophy's systematic rationalization of European colonization and exploitation. This is expressed on the one hand in successive systematizations of ethics and politics on the basis of the form of private property (thereby validating capitalism and its predations), and on the other in the

spectacular apology for Eurocentrism that is Hegelian dialectics and philosophy of history. The critiques in this special issue call for us to interrogate the unreflective and omnipresent *progressivism*—at once vapid and violent—that represents Western knowledge as a supposedly superior science, and Western society, in all its failures and cruelty, as uniquely enlightened.

As is well-known, Dussel does not seek to *replace* Western philosophy or its modernity with a subaltern alternative, but rather to move—*analectically*, in his terminology—beyond its impossible exceptionalism toward a transmodernity that can link the properly emancipatory moments of the Western tradition to global knowledge traditions and especially to the ethical and intellectual projects of the Indigenous and oppressed. Nevertheless, as these articles describe, philosophy of liberation refuses the dominative consensus of coloniality and capitalism, and finds its way forward as the companion of an insurrectionary project (charted in these articles in the innovations of successive Latin American revolutions) that moves beyond populism, reformism, and a shallow representationalism. At the same time, the shared will-to-live that grounds human striving and imagination reaches back to far before the ostensible advances of settled civilizations; in recognition of this primary principle, global collaboration is absolutely possible and necessary. In this regard, and on the occasion of this special issue published at the University of Texas, we might ask: what do these philosophical proposals ask of the Northern intellectual, academic, and educator? I would suggest that they ask of those of us in the North to imagine participating in another way of being and knowing, a hemispheric and global one, for which the crucial coordination, in the first instance, comes from elsewhere. In decentering the “center”—*abandoning it as center*—might we also find a place, alongside others, in the decisive intellectual and political project of our time?

For a century, the *critical* has been the flag for revolutionary intellectual projects in the university. This project marches on, but it is reeling, and we have to recognize now that this due as much to its own failures of imagination as it is to a resurgence of the Right. The work of Enrique Dussel and *filosofía de la liberación*, as this important collection of analyses shows, offers a path forward—carrying the emancipatory impulse of the critical tradition even beyond itself. While finding antecedents for a vision of positive freedom, beyond mere critique, in republican and socialist theoretical currents, Dussel at the same time departs from the limits of these paradigms in announcing a philosophy of/from exteriority and a politics that starts from the model of obediential power, in this way inverting the distorted cartography of Eurocentrism and locating Latin America and Indigenous knowledge at the center of political thought. This is not a special or “particular” philosophy; rather, Dussel shows us the only possible route forward for philosophy, in the Americas, if it is to be equal to its historical vocation of liberating the imagination and contributing to the struggle of the oppressed. We are lucky to be participants in this struggle at the moment of the emergence of philosophy of liberation and its collective development through the investigations of AFyL, and we are lucky to be invited into its proposals and analyses through this creative, incisive, and instructive collection of essays.

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